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ABSTRACT 
FURNISH THE BALANCE: THE 1863 ROOTS OF HARD WAR STRATEGY IN THE 
AMERICAN CIVIL WAR 
by Angela Maria Riotto 
May 2012 
Scholars consider U.S. Major General William T. Sherman's 1864 Meridian 
campaign as the origin of hard war strategy during the American Civil War. While 
Sherman's 1864 expedition is a clear demonstration of hard war, it did not begin there. 
Rather, U.S. Major General Ulysses S. Grant's planned and Sherman's implemented 
destruction of Jackson, Mississippi in May 1863 was their first use of hard war and is key 
to understanding the Union's acceptance of hard war strategy. 
Chapter I and Chapter II of this thesis explore the Army of the Tennessee's march 
to Jackson and Sherman's destruction of the city, along with Colonel Benjamin 
Grierson's deep penetration raid into Mississippi and General Order No. 100. Then, as a 
case study, Chapter III examines the Union's targeting of noncombatants and their 
property, especially Mississippi women, during the American Civil War. 
To prove that the Union first applied hard war strategy during the 1863 Vicksburg 
campaign, this thesis examines the diaries and letters of Jackson residents, contemporary 
news reports, and Grant and Sherman's memoirs and correspondence. By cross-checking 
these sources with the Southern Claims Commission records, this thesis reveals that the 
Union's destruction of Jackson was a key part of their evolving acceptance of hard war, 
in which Grant and Sherman began realizing the strategic effectiveness of attacks on both 
private property and military material. 
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INTRODUCTION 
... make the country furni sh the balance. 
- Ulysses S. Grant1 
After the U.S. Navy's 1862 capture of New Orleans, as part of Brevet Lieutenant 
General Winfield Scott' s Anaconda Plan, President Abraham Lincoln remarked, 
"Vicksburg is the key ... let us get Vicksburg and all that country is ours, the war can 
never be brought to a close until that key is in our pocket."2 Yet Vicksburg remained 
unscathed and the U.S. Navy's offensive stagnated in lower Louisiana. To conquer the 
bluff city, the Union would need to abandon conventional warfare and implement a new 
strategy. 
If Vicksburg was the key to Union victory in the West, the town of Jackson, 
Mississippi was the key to Vicksburg. Nonetheless by spring 1863, U.S. Major General 
Ulysses S. Grant had made four unsuccessful attempts to subdue Vicksburg by 
conventional means. Pressured by Lincoln and Major General Henry Halleck to seize the 
city, Grant opted for a new type of warfare - hard war. With Grant's acceptance of this 
strategy in May 1863, the Union's strategy towards the Confederacy began to evolve to 
include hard war. Furthermore, the 1863 Vicksburg campaign would serve as the Federal 
Army's rehearsal for their infamous hard war policies of 1864 and 1865. 
Two terms are vital for this thesis to be understood: hard war and total war. This 
thesis employs historian Mark Grimsley's definition of hard war, which has two key 
attributes. First, Grimsley defines hard war policies as actions against Southern civilians 
1 Ulysses S. Grant, Personal Memoirs (New York: Charles L. Webster, 1885), 262. 
2 David Dixon Porter, Incidents and Anecdotes of the Civil War (New Yo.rk: D. Appleton and Co., 
1885), 95-96; Michael Ballard, Vicksburg: The Campaign that Opened the Mississippi (Chapel Hi ll: · 
University of North Carolina Press, 2004), 24-45. 
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and property made exclusively to demoralize Southern civilians and ruin the Confederate 
economy. Second, Grimsley notes that the implementation of hard war involved the 
allocation of substantial military resources.3 Along with hard war, scholars commonly 
use the term total war. Historian William J. Philpott defines total war as "the destruction 
of civilian property and morale becomes as much an objective as the defeat of the 
enemy's armed forces, and victory is determined by the productivity of the industrial 
economy and the resilience of civilian morale as much as the size and effectiveness of the 
armed forces."4 Although this definition closely resembles that of hard war, the disparity 
lies with Philpott's emphasis on "industrial economy." The South was not an entirely 
industrial society.5 So while the Union Army did attack the South's economic 
productivity, Federal commanders primarily limited their destruction to plantations and 
farms (which this thesis considers to be private property). Therefore, the term hard war 
describes the Union commanders' actions and goals most fittingly. 
Historians consider Union Major General William T. Sherman's more popular 
and protracted February 1864 Meridian campaign as the roots of hard war strategy.6 
3 Grimsley, The Hard Hand of War, 3. 
4 William J. Philpott, "Total War," in Pa/grave Advances: Modern Military History, ed. Matthew 
Hughes and William J. Philpott (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2006), 131-1 52. 
5 John Hebron Moore, The Emergence of the Cotton Kingdom in the Southwest: Mississippi, / 770-
1860 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1988), 19-36. 
6 Mark Grimsley, The Hard Hand of War: Union Military Policy Toward Southern Civilians 
1861-1865 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995); Buckley T. Foster, Sherman's Mississippi 
Campaign (Tuscaloosa, AL: The University of Alabama Press, 2006); Ballard, Vicksburg; Michael Ballard, 
The Civil War in Mississippi: Major Campaigns and Battles (Jackson, MS: University Press of Mississippi, 
20 I I); Margie Riddle Bearrs, Sherman's Forgotten Campaign: The Meridian Expedition (Baltimore: 
Gateway Press, 1987); Timothy B. Smith, Mississippi and the Civil War: The Home Front (Jackson, MS: 
University Press of Mississippi, 20 IO); Paul F. Paskoff, "Measures of War: A Quantitative Examination of 
the Civil War's Destructiveness in the Confederacy," Civil War History 54 (March 2008) I: 35-62; John B. 
Walters, "General William T. Sherman and Total War," Journal of Southern History 14 (November 1948): 
447-80; John B. Walters, Merchant of Terror: General Sherman and Tota/: War (Indianapolis, IN: Bobbs-
Merrill, 1973); Clay Mountcastle, Punitive War: Confederate Guerrillas and Union Reprisals (Lawrence: 
University Press of Kansas, 2009). 
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While Meridian was a clear demonstration of hard war, it did not begin there. It was not, 
as historian Buckley T. Foster argues, " the dress rehearsal" for Sherman's March to the 
Sea.7 Rather, Grant' s planned and Sherman' s implemented destruction of Mississippi ' s 
capital in mid-May 1863, along with Grant' s inland campaign, was their first use of hard 
war. 
The Union Army of the Tennessee ' s march to and from Jackson, coupled with 
Sherman's destruction of that city, trained the Union high command in the West for the 
application of a similar strategy in Virginia, Georgia, and South Carolina in 1864 and 
1865. The destructive actions Grant and Sherman allowed to occur in 1863, combined 
with Colonel Benjamin Grierson's raid, laid the foundation for the Grant's 1864 
Overland campaign, Sherman' s march through Georgia and the Carolinas, and Major 
General Philip H. Sheridan's Shenandoah Valley campaign. While historians widely 
accept the later operations as hard war, the most striking - and least understood - quality 
of these campaigns is that they can all be linked to the Union's 1863 Vicksburg 
campaign. 8 Historians need to examine Grant's 1863 Vicksburg campaign as more than 
an important Union victory. The 1863 Vicksburg campaign began the evolution of Union 
strategy during the American Civil War. 
Historians, such as Warren Grabau, Michael Ballard, Edwin Bearrs, and Terrence 
Winschel , have already produced numerous studies of the operations near Vicksburg and 
the campaign' s operational significance. In his 2004 work, Vicksburg: The Campaign 
7 Foster, Sherman 's Mississippi Campaign, x. 
8 John G. Barrett, Sherman's March through the Carolinas (Chapel Hill: University of North 
Carolina Press, 1956); Burke Davis, Sherman 's March: The First Full-Length Narrative of General 
William T. Sherman's Devastating March through Georgia and the Carolinas (New York: Random House, 
1980). 
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that Opened the Mississippi, Ballard argues that hard war, which he defines as "more of 
an attitude of taking the means of making war from the enemy ... became sharply defined 
during the Vicksburg campaign."9 However, Ballard does not focus on Jackson's 
importance or Grant's inland campaign. 10 Ballard argues that hard war mostly appeared 
closer to Vicksburg's city limits and resulted largely in response to guerilla warfare. 11 So 
while Ballard challenges some long-accepted analyses of the campaign, he neglects the 
Union Army's destruction of Jackson. 
Warren Grabau also reviews Grant's advance on Jackson in May 1863 in his book 
Ninety-eight Days: A Geographer's View of the Vicksburg Campaign. Along with 
effectively illustrating Grant's reasons for nullifying the capital city, Grabau details the 
railroad's importance to both Grant and Confederate Lieutenant General John C. 
Pemberton's strategic goals in the region. In fact, Grabau rightly observes that "the 
destruction of these industries - [ an arsenal, railroad yards and shops, spinning mills, 
foundries, tanneries, and food depots] - would be felt deeply by the Confederate 
government." 12 However, Grabau overlooks Sherman's destruction of Jackson and its 
connection to the Union's acceptance of hard war. 
Although this thesis does not examine Grant's operations near Vicksburg between 
January and April 1863, it does engage many other historiographical debates. Primarily, 
it speaks to the Union's adoption of hard war/total war strategy or the "How the North 
Won" debate. Additionally, it interacts with the debates on Grant and Sherman's 
9 Ballard, Vicksburg, xii. 
10 Ballard, Vicksburg, 222. 
11 Ballard, Vicksburg, xii . 
12 Warren E. Grabau, Ninety-eight Days: A Geographer's View of the Vicksburg Campaign 
(Knoxville: The University of Tennessee Press, 2000), 240. 
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propensity for destructive war and Mississippi 's Civil War experience and strategic 
importance. Scholars have produced ample literature for each of these historical 
discussions and the Union's use of destructive war permeates each one. However, in 
spite of the many impressive studies, Civil War historians have neglected the strategic 
importance of Grant's Inland campaign and Grant's ordered and Sherman's executed 
destruction of Jackson, Mississippi in 1863 - this thesis bridges that gap. 
Works that analyze hard war, total war, or modem warfare strategies in the Civil 
War are growing, but the historiography remains incomplete. 13 Three of the best 
examples are Herman Hattaway and Archer Jones' How the North Won: A Military 
History of the Civil War, Mark Grimsley's The Hard Hand of War: Union Military 
Policy Toward Southern Civilians, 1861-1865, and Charles Royster's The Destructive 
War: William Tecumseh Sherman, Stonewall Jackson, and the Americans. 14 While these 
are essential works on Federal policy, their authors neglect the 1863 Vicksburg campaign 
as the origin of the Union's hard war strategy. 
Hattaway and Jones launched the discussion of the Union's changing policies 
with their 1983 work. 15 Their book summarizes Federal military strategy, but Hattaway 
and Jones do not adequately explore the Vicksburg campaign's significance to hard war. 
Their study satisfies the expectations of an operational history, but lacks an in-depth 
analysis of the Mississippi campaigns. This oversight could be understandable except for 
the fact that 1863 Mississippi is crucial to some of their central arguments. 
13 Bruce Catton, Grant Moves South (Boston: Little , Brown, and Company, 1960). 
14 Grimsley, The Hard Hand of War; Herman Hattaway and Archer Jones, How the North Won: A 
Military History of the Civil War (Champaign, IL: University Press of Illinois, 1983); Charles Royster, The 
Destructive War: William Tecumseh Sherman, Stonewall Jackson, and the Americans (New York: Alfred 
A. Knopf, 199 1 ). 
15 Hattaway and Jones, How the North Won. 
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Grimsley attempted to fill the void with his 1995 book, which tracks Union 
strategy throughout the war. By combining military history, diplomatic history, and 
political history, Grimsley argues that by late 1863 the Federal government's initial 
program of conciliation had failed. Hoping to end the war by demoralizing Southern 
civilians and ruining the Confederate economy, the Union gradually adopted a destructive 
war approach, especially with General Order No. l 00. This order, as part of early hard 
war strategy, allowed Union forces to confiscate and destroy enemy property, especially 
that of hostile civilians and guerilla combatants.16 
Nonetheless, Grimsley underrepresents the importance of Grant's activities in 
Mississippi. After briefly recounting the Vicksburg campaign's engagements, Grimsley 
comments, "In most respect they formed clear examples of the emergent hard war 
strategy. But they were not yet intended to achieve results independently of the 
traditional battlefield orientation." 17 Grimsley further states "neither Grant nor anyone 
else saw this destruction as anymore than an unfortunate byproduct of military 
necessity." 18 Grimsley overlooks that neither Grant nor Sherman seemed vexed by this 
"unfortunate byproduct," nor were they hesitant to use such in the future. Moreover, as 
Chapter I explains below, to completely define hard war as occurring devoid of 
conventional military strategy distorts the notion by creating a false dichotomy. Rather, 
it was this campaign that first illuminated hard war' s benefits as dependent and 
independent of battlefield orientation. The Vicksburg campaign was more than, as 
Grimsley suggests, conventional warfare. Instead, it was the cradle of hard war. 
16 Nicknamed for its author, Francis Leiber, this order outlined proper mil itary conduct, such as 
the treatment of guerrillas, hospital locations, and flags of truce. · 
17 Grimsley, TheHardHandofWar, 157. 
18 Grimsley, The Hard Hand of War, 157. 
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Along with Grimsley, Royster's 1991 The Destructive War explores the 
devastating nature of warfare. His chapters on Sherman are especially exhaustive and 
enrich the hard war scholarship. Yet Royster ignores the Mississippi campaign and 
focuses on Sherman's 1864 incursions. This is likely due to the brevity of the Jackson, 
Mississippi raid in comparison to the March to the Sea and the broad focus of Royster's 
work. However, an analysis of the Jackson campaign is fundamental to understanding 
the significance of Royster's larger arguments. 
Fueled by World War I, World War II, and European historians, some scholars 
contend that Grant's demand for unconditional surrender transformed the Civil War into 
the first modern war - a total war. The persistence of unconditional surrender into and 
throughout the twentieth-century corroborates this argument. 19 As a result, several 
scholars propose that the Civil War was·not a unique hard war phenomenon, but rather 
the beginning to the twentieth-century's total war method. 
The other side of the debate suggests that the Civil War was not the start of a new, 
modern way of war, but a continuation of brutal armed conflict.2° For instance, Wayne 
Wei-Siang Hsieh argues that "harsh critiques of Civil War violence as harbingers of 
twentieth-century brutality share with Whiggish narratives the unproven assumption that 
the American Civil War forged a fulcrum point not just for American history, but for the 
19 Mark E. Neely, "Was the Civil War a Total War?," Civil War History 50 (December 2004) 4: 
434-458; John F. Marszalek, "The Inventor of Total Warfare," Notre Dame Magazine 18 (Summer 1989): 
28-31; Hugh Dubre lie, "A Military Legacy of the Civil War: The British Inheritance," Civil War History 49 
(June 2003) 2: 153-180; Charles Strozier, Unconditional Surrender and the Rhetoric of Total War: From 
Truman to Lincoln (New York: Center on Violence and Human Survival, 1987); James M. McPherson, 
Lincoln and the Strategy of Unconditional Surrender (Gettysburg: Gettysburg College, 1984 ), 11-13, 23-
24; William J. Philpott, "Total War," in Pa/grave Advances: Modern Military History, ed. Matthew Hughes 
and William J. Philpott (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2006), 131-152. · 
20 Wayne Wei-Siang Hsieh, 'Total War and the American Civil War Reconsidered: The End of an 
Outdated 'Master Narrative,"' The Journal of the Civil War Era I (September 2011) 3: 394-408. 
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modern world."21 Rather, European armies implemented destructive strategy 
successfully throughout the medieval period and the pre-modem period. Consequently, it 
continued through to the modem period. 
Likewise, other military historians ask "compared to what?" in regards to the 
Civi l War's brutality. Military historian Robert Citino illuminates that, comparatively, 
the American Civil War was not incredibly bloody or devastating.22 This thesis is not as 
concerned with taking a position in this debate as it is with hard war's role in America's 
defining conflict. What matters here is that military commanders began the war with 
conventional strategy, which targeted only traditional military objectives. Then, in mid-
1863, with the support of Lincoln and Halleck, Grant introduced hard war in an effort to 
seize Vicksburg, nearly a year earlier than most historians have recognized. 
In addition to monographs on the Union's destructive policies, numerous scholars 
have examined Mississippi ' s Civil War experience.23 These works range from campaign 
histories to social history analyses, but their authors still ignore the Jackson raid's larger 
repercussions. Timothy B. Smith provides the necessary background of Jackson, its 
importance to the war effort, and Vicksburg' s eventual collapse, but his description of 
Sherman's May occupation is brief.24 Similarly, Ballard only allocates a few pages to 
Jackson' s destruction in his 2011 The Civil War in Mississippi: Major Campaigns and 
2 1 Hsieh, "Tota l War and the American Civil War," 394. 
22 Robert M. Citino, review o f The Civil War and the limits of Destruction, by Mark E. Neely, H-
CivWar, H-Net Reviews (August , 2009). 
23 Historians Michael Ballard, Timothy B. Smith, Marg ie Riddle Bearrs, Edwin Bearrs, Buckley T . 
Foster, and Warren Grabau are only a few scholars who have produced examinations of these campaigns. 
Ballard, Vicksburg; Ballard, The Civil War in Mississippi; Bearrs, Sherman 's Forgotten Campaign; Smith, 
Mississippi and the Civil War; Grabau, Ninety-eight Days. 
24 Smith, Mississippi and the Civil War, 4-7. 
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Baltles.15 Grabau' s geographic study of the Vicksburg campaign also briefly reviewed 
the battle and Sherman's subsequent damage of the city. 
Using the term "total war" to describe the Union' s strategy, Smith discusses its 
affect on Confederate morale and motivation.26 Disputing the "lack of will" thesis, Smith 
maintains that Mississippians possessed "a definite will to win even to the end."27 Smith 
admits that Sherman's total war tactics, and the fall of Jackson and Vicksburg, weakened 
Mississippians' resolve. As with Georgia, Alabama, and the Carolinas, Federal 
devastation might have challenged Mississippians' resolve, but Smith contends that they 
did not surrender easily.28 
According to Smith, Mississippi's defeat was twofold. It included the collapse of 
the state's infrastructure - at the hand of Northern troops - and the growing Unionist and 
African-American contingent in the state. With the Emancipation Proclamation and the 
Federal Army' s expeditions through the state, many enslaved blacks fled their plantations 
and joined Union supporters to challenge the weakened state government. Smith thus 
analyzes total war's impact in the state, but he does not discuss its relationship to the 
larger Union war effort.29 
Incorporating the Official Records and other secondary military histories, 
Ballard's 2011 work impressively reviews Grant's inland campaign and concentrates on 
25 Ballard, Vicksburg, 280-281; Ballard, The Civil War in Mississippi. 
26 Smith, Mississippi and the Civil War, 68. 
27 Smith, Mississippi and the Civil War, 2-4. For more works that discuss the " lack of will" thesis, 
see Richard E. Beringer, Herman Hattaway, Archer Jones, and William N. Still, Jr., Why the South Lost the 
Civil War (Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press, 1986); E. Merton Coulter, The Confederate States of 
America, 186/-/ 865 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1950); Hattaway and Jones, How the 
North Won. . 
28 Smith, Mississippi and the Civil War, 3. 
29 Smith, Mississippi and the Civil War, 68. 
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Grant's conventional tactics and inner-am1y politics.30 Though the book is fundamentally 
a campaign history, it still does not address hard war's 1863 origins in Mississippi. 
Ballard's earlier study, Vicksburg: The Campaign that Opened the Mississippi, however, 
does engage the debate, noting that hard war appeared during the Vicksburg campaign. 31 
Ballard argues that Grant and Sherman implemented hard war policies on Vicksburg's 
outskirts, but not during Grant's inland campaign.32 In fact, Ballard overlooks Grant's 
ordered confiscation and destruction of wagons, cotton, and draft animals between 30 
April and 15 May 1863. 
This thesis agrees with Ballard's chronology of hard war's appearance, but not the 
geographic location or Union commanders' motives. Ballard views hard war as 
retaliation to guerilla activities. When applied to General Order No. 100 and General 
Order No. 60, which stated that guerrillas or hostile persons would have their items 
confiscated as punishment, Ballard's hypothesis is valid.33 However, when Grant ordered 
the abandonment of his supply lines and the pillaging of Mississippi's countryside he did 
not cite guerillas as the threat that inspired the policy.34 Consequently, Ballard's thesis 
falls short when applied to the entire 1863 Vicksburg campaign. 
Edwin and Margie Bearrs also skim Jackson's destruction in their respective 
campaign histories. Edwin Bearrs and Warren Grabau's collaborative battle history is 
30 Ballard, The Civil War in Mississippi, I 03- 107, 140- 144. For more information, see Ballard, 
Vicksbur1f: 
"
1 Ballard, Vicksburg, xii. 
32 Ballard, Vicksburg, 222 . 
33 Joan Waugh, U.S. Grant: American Hero, American Myth (Chapel Hill: University of North 
Carol ina Press, 2009), 60. 
34 Grant, Memoirs, 229. 
xv 
one of the most complete portraits of the battle at Jackson. 35 However, Bearrs and 
Grabau overlook Sherman's subsequent destruction of the city. Recognizing this void, 
Buckley T. Foster offered his own examination of Grant's hard war strategy. Like his 
predecessors, though, Foster disregards Jackson and cites the Meridian campaign in 
winter 1863 and 1864 as the beginning of hard war strategy. Aiming to provide a 
thorough study of the development of Sherman's "unique style of warfare," Foster 
contends, "Sherman's experiences in his march across the Magnolia State shaped and 
solidified his style of warfare for the rest of the conflict. "36 
This thesis agrees with much of Foster' s argument - Sherman' s march across 
Mississippi did shape his hard war policies of 1864. Yet Foster aligns himself with the 
standing historiography by placing this evolution a year too late. Sherman's destruction 
of Jackson in May 1863 was the rehearsal, not his later and lengthier Meridian 
Expedition. Although Foster places the switch to hard war in early 1864, he understands 
that Union commanders did not develop this style quickly. Instead, Foster suggests that 
Sherman cultivated hard war strategy, as did Grant, throughout the war. Moreover, 
Foster rightly compares Grant's use of hard war in Mississippi and Sherman's tactics in 
Georgia and the Carolinas, but Foster fails to recognize the Vicksburg campaign as hard 
war' s debut. 
Scholars have also studied Grant' s military career, his proclivity for hard war, and 
35 Bearrs, Sherman's Forgotten Campaign; Edwin Bearrs and Warren Grabau, The Battle of 
Jackson May I 4, 1863, The Siege of Jackson July 10-17, 1863, Three Other Post-Vicksburg Actions 
(Baltimore: Gateway Press, 1981 ). 
36 Foster, Sherman 's Mississippi Campaign, x. 
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unconditional surrender.37 Some historians argue that Grant possessed the "good 
American common sense, to recognize the need to wage modern, total war against the 
South, and the will to do so brilliantly."38 While some admire Grant's use of total war or 
attritional warfare, others condemn Grant's actions and label him a "butcher."39 This 
thesis will not engage this debate, but it does take issue with scholars who limit their 
discussion to Grant's 1864 Overland campaign. For scholars to understand Grant and 
Sherman's contribution to Civil War strategy and modern warfare, they must examine 
their earlier campaigns. 
Joan Waugh discusses Grant's shift to hard war during the Vicksburg campaign in 
her discussion of his Civil War experiences. Yet she fai ls to recognize hard war's origins 
in 1863. 40 Grant discusses his own transformation in his memoirs after recalling the 
battle of Shiloh. Grant remarks that "[he] gave up all idea of saving the Union except by 
complete conquest."41 Therefore, with this revelation and the abundant secondary 
literature, this thesis does not question Grant's personal reasons for hard war.42 However, 
this thesis will explore when hard war originated, how it developed, and how Federal 
troops similarly implemented it on Sherman's march through Georgia and the Carolinas 
and Grant's Overland campaign. It stresses that Grant and Sherman did not fashion hard 
37 Ethan Rafuse, " Still A Mystery?: General Grant and the Historians, 1981-2006," The Journal of 
Military History 71 (July 2007) 3: 849-874. 
38 Bruce Catton, U.S. Grant and the American Military Tradition (Boston: Little, Brown, and 
Company, 1954); Catton, Grant Moves South ; Bruce Catton, Grant Takes Command (Boston: Little, 
Brown, and Company, 1968); T. Harry Wi ll iams, The History of American Wars: From 1745 to 1918 (New 
York: Knopf, 1981), 252- 53, 268-71, 286-88, 293-302. 
39 Rafuse, "Still A Mystery?" 856; Wil liam S. Mcfeely, Grant: A Biography (New York: W.W. 
Norton, 198 1 ). 
40 Waugh, U.S. Grant, 60-61. 
41 Grant, Memoirs, 193. 
42 Clay Mountcastle, Punitive War: Confederate Guerrillas and Union Reprisals (Lawrence: 
University Press of Kansas, 2009). 
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war overnight, nor did such tactics only transpire during prolonged, incredibly 
devastating campaigns like the March to the Sea and the Overland campaign. 
Historians have also examined Sherman's switch to hard war.43 Sherman's 
biographers commonly explore his destructive policies against Southern civilians and 
property. Michael Fellman argues that Sherman played a central role in hard war's 
development and execution; but Fellman, like Margie Bearrs, attributes his strategy to his 
psyche.44 Bearrs, along with Buckley T. Foster, maintain that Sherman's transformation 
was in direct response to his son's death. Foster also contends that Sherman chose hard 
war in retaliation for the actions of Southern guerillas. Prior to Fellman's biography, 
John Marszalek challenged Albert Castel's that Sherman feared direct confrontation after 
Shiloh and Kennesaw Mountain.45 Marszalek asserts that Sherman believed war was 
between societies as much as between armies. Therefore, it had to be fought fiercely so 
that it could be ended quickly. Moreover, Marszalek maintains that Sherman wanted to 
kill the Confederacy by destroying property and the South's ability to continue the 
struggle.46 Marszalek claims that Sherman especially learned these lessons in 
Mississippi. This thesis accepts Marszalek's argument, and further contends that 
Sherman realized hard war's benefits during the Vicksburg campaign and then 
enthusiastically implemented them later in the war. 
43 John Marszalek, Sherman: A Soldier's Passion for Order (New York: Vintage Books, 1993); 
Michael Fellman. Citizen Sherman: A life of William Tecumseh Sherman (New York: Random House, 
1995); Stanley P. Hirshson, The White Tecumseh: A Biography of General William T Sherman (New York: 
John Wiley and Sons, 1997). 
44 Fellman, Citizen Sherman. 
45 Albert Castel, Decision in the West: The Atlanta Campaign of 1864 (Lawrence: University Press 
of Kansas, 1992). 
46 John Marszalek, Sherman, 309-3 10. 
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To demonstrate that the Union first applied hard war in 1863, rather than later in 
Sherman's Meridian campaign or his March to the Sea, this thesis examines diaries and 
letters from numerous Jackson residents and visitors to the city. Grant and Sherman 
wanted the hard war strategy to demoralize the civilian population. Therefore, Southern 
civilians' writings are fundamental. One must examine the Union commanders' memoirs 
and correspondence to fully comprehend their choice to accept hard war strategy and 
apply it to the Vicksburg campaign. The official military reports and correspondence of 
Confederate generals Johnston and Pemberton also are necessary, as are the writings of 
U.S. President Abraham Lincoln and Confederate President Jefferson Davis. While these 
sources are especially enlightening, individual soldiers' opinions are also revealing. The 
use of both officers and soldiers' writings illustrate hard war's benefits and how Union 
troops implemented it during the Vicksburg campaign. 
Along with the Official Records and personal writings, this thesis incorporates 
contemporary news reports, the 1860 U.S. Census, and Southern Claims Commission 
(SCC) records. The latter are especially helpful, because both the approved and barred 
reports detail the items allegedly taken by Union troops during their campaign. By 
comparing the SCC records to the Official Records and civilian writings, one can see the 
full impact of hard war, its successes, and Grant and Sherman's reasons for choosing this 
innovative strategy. 
This thesis is organized into three chapters. Timothy B. Smith likened Jackson, as 
the state's capital and the intersection of four maj or rail lines, to a wheel ' s hub. 
Accordingly the first chapter, like Jackson in 1863, acts as a hub from which all other 
topics extend. While this is not chronological, this organization is a necessary framework 
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in which to discuss the evolution of Union strategy, specifically their earlier hard war 
actions of April 1863, as discussed in Chapter II. Within this framework, Chapter I 
includes a detailed discussion of Jackson's strategic importance to both Confederate and 
Union forces. Chapter I then explores Northern troops ' destruction of the city in May 
1863, Grant' s orders to Sherman, and more importantly, Sherman's orders to his men. 
The chapter then traces Jackson 's relationship to the Meridian campaign and Sherman's 
swath through Georgia and the Carolinas. 
Maintaining a war and society methodology, the second chapter reviews Grant's 
1863 overland push towards Vicksburg before his attack on Jackson. This part assesses 
Grant's earlier attempts to subdue the bluff city in late 1862 and early 1863. After this 
review, the chapter tracks Grant's movements below Vicksburg and into the heart of 
Mississippi. While Chapter II traces five major engagements, it is not an arrangement of 
battle analyses. Rather, after swiftly detailing the smaller inland campaign, the chapter 
reveals the operation's resemblance to Grant's notorious Overland campaign and 
Sheridan's burning of the Shenandoah Valley. Chapter II also explores Grant's strategic 
aims for Colonel Benjamin Grierson's raid, its influence on Grant's later operations in the 
Eastern Theater, and the raid's hard war aspects. 
Working as a case study, Chapter III draws from LeeAnn Whites, Drew Gilpin 
Faust, Nina Silber, Catherine Clinton, and others to explore Mississippi women' s 
experiences with hard war.47 This section explores Union troops' destruction of private 
47 Catherine Cl inton and Nina Silber, Battle Scars: Gender and Sexuality in the American Civil 
War (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006); LeeAnn Whites and Alecia P. Long, Occupied Women: 
Gender, Military Occupation, and the American Civil War (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 
2009); Catherine Clinton, "'Public Women' and Sexual Politics during the American Civil War," in 
Clinton and Silber, Battle Scars, 61; Michael Fellman, "Women and Guerilla Warfare," in Clinton and . 
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residences and how such experiences affected civilian and soldier morale. Several Civil 
War historians argue that Southerners linked the public and private spheres. Therefore, 
Union troops' shattering of Southerners' homes, possessions, and morale would have 
indirectly affected the Confederate soldiers on the battlefront. 
During the 1863 Vicksburg campaign, Grant and Sherman permitted ( or at least 
ignored) their troops to ransack many upper class Jackson homes. While this was not 
uncommon by the end of the war, hard war strategy only started to evolve in spring 1863. 
Additionally, it was unusual for Federal soldiers to raid women's personal spaces without 
being reprimanded before 1863.48 However, in May 1863 Grant and Sherman would 
allow their men to ransack women's personal spaces; and by November 1864, Sherman 
would permit his men to wreak havoc in an effort to demoralize the civilian population 
and end the war.49 But the training ground for this happened more than a year earlier in 
Mississippi. 
One might argue that Federals implemented hard war prior to Jackson, such as at 
Holly Springs in December 1862. According to Cyrus Boyd, a Yankee soldier who 
witnessed the Holly Spring's occupation, "The soldiers were in every house and garret 
Silber, Divided Houses, 147; Drew Gilpin Faust, Mothers of Invention: Women of the Slaveholding South in 
the American Civil War (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1996); Drew Gilpin Faust, 
"Altars of Sacrifice: Confederate Women and the Narratives of War," in Clinton and Silber, Divided 
Houses, 171 ; LeeAnn Whites, Civil War as a Crisis in Gender: Augusta, Georgia, 1860-1890 (Athens, GA: 
The University of Georgia Press, 1995); Jacqueline Glass Campbell, When Sherman Marched North from 
the Sea: Resistance on the Confederate Home Front (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 
2003); Lisa Tendrich Frank, "Bedrooms as Battlefields: The Role of Gender Politics in Sherman's March" 
in Whites and Long, Occupied Women; Stephanie McCurry, Confederate Reckoning: Power and Politics in 
the Civil War South (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 20 I 0). 
48 Steven J. Ramold, Baring the Iron Hand: Discipline in the Union Army (DeKalb, IL: Northern 
Illinois University Press, 20 I 0), 276-277. 
49 Frank, "Bedrooms as Battlefields." 
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and cellar, store and church, and nook and corner."50 While troops laid waste to the city, 
Union officers did not sanction these actions. In fact, Sherman and Grant winced at their 
soldiers' behavior.51 In Jackson, though, Sherman urged soldiers to destroy all military 
materials. Moreover, neither Grant nor Sherman punished recklessness during the sack 
of Jackson or on the march to the city. This disparity illuminates Grant and Sherman's 
growing acceptance of hard war strategy one earlier than many Civil War historians have 
thought. 
50 John K. Bettersworth, "Excerpt from Throne, The Civil War Diary of Cyrus F. Boyd, 96-98," 
Mississippi in the Confederacy (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1961 ), 208. 
51 Grant, Memoirs, 232-242. 
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CHAPTER I 
JACKSON 
There will be nothing left of it. Nothing is safe or respected here, 
but every thing destructible seems doomed to destruction. Such is war. 
- U.S. Lieutenant Seth A. Ranlett 1 
Geographically, politically, and economically Jackson is the heart of Mississippi 
and, in 1863, it was the lifeline to Vicksburg. As the state's capital and a major industrial 
city, Jackson boasted the intersection of Mississippi's four railroads, numerous rail yards 
and equipment shops, the state arsenal, mills, foundries, and food depots.2 Confederate 
war materials, packaged food items, cotton, and troops streamed from this epicenter to 
Mississippi ' s four comers. Recognizing this fact, in spring 1863 Major General Ulysses 
S. Grant demanded the destruction of "all possibility of aid" from Jackson to Vicksburg.3 
Grant believed that to sever military assistance to Vicksburg from the capital and 
consequently from the entire state would result in Vicksburg's surrender and end 
Confederate control in the Western Theater. This order launched the evolution of the 
Union' s hard war policies. 
The Hub 
By the mid-nineteenth century, Jackson was a budding metropolis of 2,100 
people.4 Mississippi ' s four major railroad lines- the Southern Railroad of Mississippi 
from the East; the New Orleans, Jackson, and Great Northern from the South; the 
Mississippi Central from the North; and the Vicksburg, Shreveport, Texas line from the 
1 Lieutenant Seth A. Ranlett, "The Capture of Jackson," Civil War Papers (Boston: Commandery, 
1900), 1:351. 
2 Grabau, Ninety-eight Days, 240. 
3 Grant, Personal Memoirs, 265 . 
4 Joseph C. G. Kennedy, ed., U.S. Bureau of the Census, Population of The United States in 
1860; Compiled from the Original Returns of the Eight Census, under the Direction of the Secretary of the 
Interior (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1864). 
2 
West - all met in Jackson. 5 Converging in the northwest district of the city, this growing 
rail system connected the chief trade centers of Vicksburg, Natchez, Meridian, Corinth, 
and Grenada. During the war these lines transported civilians, troops, and staple goods, 
primarily cotton, in all directions.6 Jackson's location on these lines and the Pearl River 
prompted many enterprising cotton producers to relocate to the city, and by 1860 Jackson 
surpassed Vicksburg as Mississippi's cotton-shipping epicenter.7 
Sustained by the railways and the burgeoning industry, Jackson easily became the 
heart of Mississippi's war effort with many "Dixie Works," or buildings that contained 
forges, machinery, and war materials.8 For example, one of Mississippi Central's 
storehouses kept an impressive ninety locomotives for the Confederacy's use. Along 
with spare engines, railroad companies also kept loose cars and lumber near the depots.9 
The Southern Railroad of Mississippi stocked approximately fifty railcars and extra 
lumber along their lines. 10 While private companies owned these items, the Confederate 
military requisitioned them as needed. The Greens, for example, owned a cotton factory 
and bank that the Confederate government commonly used and, at one point, seized for 
forty days prior to Grant's occupation of the city. 11 Moreover, the Green brothers 
claimed that the Confederate authorities often "seize[ d] and carr[ied] off' their goods 
5 Grabau, Ninety-eight Days, map I. 
6 Timothy 8. Smith, "Jackson: The Capital City and the Civi l War," Mississippi History Now, 
Mississippi Historical Society, http://mshistory.k I 2.ms.us/articles/337 /jackson-the-capital-city-and-the-
civil-war (accessed 12 January 20 11 ). 
7 Moore, The Emergence of the Collon Kingdom, 178-179. 
8 
"Colonel Bussy's Expedition," The Rebellion Record: A Diary of American Events: Documents 
and Narratives (New York, 1864), 7: 452. 
9 Ranlett, "The Capture of Jackson," 35 1-352. 
10 Ranlett, "The Capture of Jackson," 351 -352. 
11 Reports of Commillees of House of Representatives for the Second Session of the Forty-Third 
Congress, 1874- 1875 (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1875), Report No. 5: I. 
without compensation. 12 Like these two businesses, the Confederacy expected many 
businesses to contribute to the war effort. 
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The Confederacy demanded that clothing and shoe factories, mills, and cotton 
gins also generate materials for the cause. 13 In May 1863, Governor John J. Pettus 
pressed civilians to sustain the Confederacy in Mississippi. Pettus declared, "awake, then 
- arouse, Mississippians, young and old, from your fertile plains, your beautiful towns 
and cities, your once quiet and happy but now desecrated homes, come and join your 
brothers in arms, your sons and neighbors, who are now bearing their bosoms to the 
storm of battle at your very doors and in defence [sic] of all you hold dear." 14 Many 
Southerners, male and female, answered the call, either by fighting or by producing 
goods for the cause. Grant and Sherman witnessed the Greens' factory where the female 
workers embroidered cloth with C.S.A. (Confederate States of America). Since such 
actions supported the enemy, even in this small way, Grant ordered the building and 
surplus cloth burned. 15 This was an early demonstration of hard war. Grant and Sherman 
would continue to implement such actions during their later campaigns. 
Along with the railway system, Jackson featured the state's only Deaf and Dumb 
institute, a lunatic asylum, the state penitentiary, the Governor's Mansion, and the State 
House.16 Besides containing the state 's main institutions, Jackson also had Masonic, 
concert, and lyceum halls, and a variety of hotels and restaurants, including the Bowman 
12 Reports of Committees of House of Representatives, 2. 
13 Smith, The Home Front, 72-75. 
14 
"The Scare in Mississippi: Proclamation of Governor Pettus, Executive Office, Jackson, Miss., 
May 5, 1863," New York Herald, 20 May 1863, 3. · 
15 OR, vol. 24, pt. I: 754. For further discussion of Greens' mil l, see Chapter III of this thesis. 
16 Yan Dorn, P.A, "Original Plan for the City of Jackson, 1822," Mississippi Department of 
Archives and History, Jackson, Mississippi . The asylums and Governor's Mansion sat on the city' s 
western periphery, the penitentiary was positioned in northern Jackson, and the State House and City Hall 
were located in downtown. 
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House and the Confederate Hotel. 17 Not only was the city home to the Confederate 
Department of Mississippi and East Louisiana's (D.M.E.L.) in 1863, but it was also the 
cultural, political, and economic nucleus of the state. 18 Recognizing the capital's 
economic, political , and operational significance, Grant aimed to damage it severely 
enough that it could not offer any aid to Confederate Lieutenant General John C. 
Pemberton or General Joseph E. Johnston's forces. By debilitating the capital and the 
D.M.E.L.'s supply and communication base, Grant hoped to subdue Vicksburg, open the 
Mississippi River for the U.S. Navy, and end the war in the Western Theater. 
The Department of Mississippi and East Louisiana 
Grant's adversary during the entire Vicksburg campaign was the Confederacy's 
Department of the West, commanded by General Joseph E. Johnston. It was composed 
of two main armies - the Army of Tennessee and Department of Mississippi and East 
Louisiana. General Braxton Bragg directed the Army of Tennessee (the main mobile 
force in the Western Theater), while Lieutenant General John C. Pemberton oversaw the 
D.M.E.L. Headquartered in Jackson, the D.M.E.L. - comprised of three individual 
garrisons and four districts with over forty thousand men - was less mobile than its larger 
counterpart. Some reports estimate Pemberton's department at sixty thousand troops, but 
due to Grant's successful diversions in spring 1863 only six thousand Confederate troops 
were in Jackson when Grant surrounded it. 19 Although Pemberton had remained at his 
Jackson headquarters until I May, the capital's fortifications remained unfinished and 
17 The Confederate Hotel was previously the United States Hotel. The Eighth U.S. Census lists 
two confectioners, four hotelkeepers, two coffee housekeepers, four bakers, and two bar keepers. This list 
is most likely incomplete. Nonetheless, it does give the impression that Jackson was a growing metropolis. 
18 Moore, The Emergence of the Colton Kingdom, 178. 
19 A.P. Mason Report, 24 May 1863, OR, vol. 24 pt. 3: 876. 
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reinforcements were days away.20 When Pemberton finally left Jackson, it was not to 
intercept Grant on his march but instead to ride to Vicksburg. Pemberton's choice to 
abandon the capital endangered the city, cornered his troops in Vicksburg, and resulted in 
his surrender on 4 July 1863. 
In addition to sealing his own fate, Pemberton imperiled Johnston and Brigadier 
General John Gregg's forces as well. Johnston did not arrive in Jackson until 13 May 
and only then did he learn of Sherman's wedge between him and Pemberton.21 By the 
time either commander organized his troops, the vanguard of Grant's army were battling 
Gregg's three thousand men in the Battle of Raymond, twenty-six miles southeast of the 
capital.22 Therefore, after assessing the situation on the evening of 13 May, Johnston 
wired President Davis in Richmond, "I am too late."23 Nevertheless, Johnston did not 
immediately abandon the capital. Rather, he sent three couriers with an urgent message 
to Pemberton ordering him to bring the Vicksburg garrison east to attack the Federals. 
Yet, Johnston realized its futility, placed Gregg in command of Jackson, and ordered the 
military and civilian evacuation of the city. Then, Johnston and his staff rode to Canton, 
twenty-four miles northeast of Jackson.24 
Hard War as a Strategy 
Following Grant's four failed attempts to capture Vicksburg by conventional 
means between January and April 1863 and his innovative Inland campaign across 
20 Grabau, Ninety-eight Days, 244. 
2 1 Johnston to Pemberton, 13 May 1863, OR, vol. 24, pt. 3: 870; Pemberton to Major General 
Theodore Johnston, 11 May 1863, OR, vol. 24, pt. I: 858; Pemberton to Johnston, 13 May 1863, OR, vol. 
24, pt. 3: 872. 
22 G regg to Pemberton, 12 May 1863, OR, vol. 24, pt. 3 : 862; OR, vol. 24, pt. I : 739; Pemberton to 
Bowen or Loring, 12 May 1863, OR, vol. 24, pt. 3: 86 1. Gregg's forces fought McPherson 's troops at the 
Battle of Raymond on 12 May 1862, ending in Union victory. 
23 OR, vol. 24, pt. I: 215; Grabau, Ninety-eight Days, 246. 
24 William Tecumseh Sherman, Personal Memoirs of General W. T Sherman (New York: Charles 
L. Webster & Co., 1891), 297; Grabau, Ninety-eight Days, 247. 
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Mississippi's southeastern quadrant, Grant advanced on Jackson with his three corps 
commanders - Major General William T. Sherman, Major General John A. McClernand, 
and Major General James McPherson.25 Grant permitted his troops to pillage during their 
march to Jackson and now that they were at the city 's limits, he allowed them to continue 
their destruction. 
Grant and Sherman's 1863 acceptance of hard war may have resulted from the 
Federal government 's 1862 Confiscation Act, which permitted Union soldiers to take 
items from abandoned homes. This act differed from the original 1861 Confiscation Act 
that punished treason with the confiscation of private property, primarily the slaves of 
secessionists.26 In response to this act in an effort to protect against wanton confiscation, 
General George McClellan, commander of the Army of the Potomac in 1861 , issued that 
private property "should not be interfered with, unless it be of military utility .. . and you 
are justified in taking measures to prevent pillage or any outrage."27 
Sherman also, at this time, prohibited wanton destruction. In November 1861, 
realizing his troops' proclivity for raiding and vandalizing unoccupied homes, Sherman 
issued a general order that forbade such conduct and specified, "The first duty of the 
soldier is the protection of the citizen. The political character of the citizen is not to be 
judged and weighed in this manner by the soldier, and there must be by him no 
molestation of his lawful rights."28 This order dictated Union military policy until an 
25 Ballard, Vicksburg, 222. 
26 J;:imes McPherson, The Battle Cry of Freedom: The Civil War Era (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1988), 353-356. 
27 Lorenzo Thomas to Sherman, 22 November 1861, OR, vol. 6, pt. I : 192. 
18 
- General Order No. 24, I I November 1861, OR, vol. 6, pt. I: 187. 
increase in guerrilla activities in the Western Theater spawned the 1862 Confiscation 
Act.29 
Shortly after Congress passed the 1862 Confiscation Act, Major General John 
Pope issued a series of general orders to seize property from traitors without 
compensation and to shoot captured guerilla combatants.30 Although Pope never 
executed any of these orders, he laid a foundation that may have predisposed Grant and 
Sherman to similar actions later in the war. For example, during his 1862 Memphis 
occupation, Sherman banished families of suspected guerillas and confiscated their 
property in accordance to the Confiscation Acts. Yet, neither Grant nor Sherman 
permitted soldiers to pillage en masse until spring 1863. 
7 
Before this point, Union officers condemned such reckless use of force and 
supported the Union's policy of conciliation.31 For example·, in January 1863 Sherman 
expressed anger and disappointment at the fact that his troops committed arson in 
Arkansas. Sherman denounced unnecessary abuses and told his brother-in-law that he 
"would throw the man who started the fire into the flames ifhe caught him."32 Yet just 
four months later when several prestigious Jackson buildings burned, Sherman just 
shrugged when his own troops started the fires.33 The condemnation of mass confiscation 
and pillaging dictated Union military strategy until General Order No. I 00 in April 1863. 
29 McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom, 499. 
-o 
, McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom, 50 I. 
3 1 Grimsley, The Hard Hand of War, 23. 
32 MS. Diary, 18 January 1863, Hugh B. Ewing Papers, Ohio Historical Society, Columbus, Ohio, 
quoted in Grimsley, The Hard Hand of War, 154. 
33 Sherman, Personal Memoirs, 297-298. 
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General Order No. 100, or Leiber's Code, greatly differed from the North' s 1861 
and 1862 Confiscation Acts and Sherman's earlier opinions of destructive warfare. 
Nicknamed for its author, Francis Leiber, this order outlined proper military conduct, 
such as the treatment of guerrillas, hospital location, and flags of truce. 34 While these are 
standard protocols, the document's obscure definitions of havoc and necessity made it 
innovative. According to Leiber's Code, "The more vigorously wars are pursued the 
better it is for humanity."35 So while Leiber's Code expressively prohibits "wanton 
devastation," pillaging, and vandalism "even after taking a place by main force" - as in 
Jackson - it did not include definitions of such extremes.36 
Historian Mark Grimsley explains that General Order No. 100 "argued that 
protection to enemy civilians was the exception, not the rule."37 In fact, while the code 
prohibited heedless violence it did not forbid military retaliation against hostile civilians. 
For instance, the code states, "A victorious army appropriates all public money, seizes all 
public movable property until further direction by its government, and sequesters for its 
own benefit or of that of its government all the revenues of real property belonging to the 
hostile government or nation."38 Moreover, "Private property, unless forfeited by crimes 
or by offenses of the owner, can be seized only by way of military necessity, for the 
support or other benefit of the army or of the United States. If the owner has not fled, the 
commanding officer will cause receipts to be given, which may serve the spoilated owner 
to obtain indemnity."39 Therefore, the Federal government began allowing soldiers to 
34 Grims ley, The Hard Hand of War, 150 . 
35 General Order No. I 00, 24 April 1863, OR, Series 3, vo l. 3, 150-1 51. 
36 General Order No. 100, 24 April 1863, OR, Series 3, vo l. 3, 151, 153; Grimsley, The Hard 
Hand of War, 1~0. 
37 Grimsley, The Hard Hand of War, 150. 
38 General Order No. I 00, 24 April 1863 , OR, Series 3, vol. 3, 151. 
39 General Order No. I 00, 24 April 1863, OR, Series 3, vol. 3, 152. 
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raid unoccupied homes and the homes of hostiles. 
In fact, Leiber' s Code actually considered hostile civilians to be equal to guerilla 
combatants. This was in response to increased hostility in Memphis, New Orleans, and 
other cities under Union occupation. As with Sherman in Memphis months earlier, 
according to Leiber's Code, the commanding officer determined those who deserved 
military protection and those who gave "positive aid and comfort to the rebellious enemy 
without being boldly forced thereto."4° Consequently, due to this order's obscurity, the 
Army of the Tennessee's actions against Jackson civilians in May 1863 would have been 
'd d . d 41 cons1 ere Just an necessary. 
Grant and Sherman in Jackson 
On 14 May, following a three-hour fight against Gregg's battered forces, Grant 
marched into the heart of Mississippi and severed the lifeline to Vicksburg.42 As Union 
troops raised the United States flag, Grant entered the Bowman House and summoned 
Sherman and McPherson to discuss Jackson's fate.43 First, Grant demanded the 
demolition of the capital's railroads in every direction. Grant, like his Confederate 
counterparts, considered the Vicksburg, Shreveport, Texas line to be the most prized and 
most economically significant in Mississippi during the antebellum period. It not only 
boosted the cotton trade, but also linked the state's two economic and political centers. 
Furthermore, the Confederates relied on this line to transport reinforcements and supplies 
to Vicksburg.44 
40 General Order No. 100, 24 April 1863, OR, Series 3, vol. 3, 163. 
4 1 Marszalek, Sherman, 195. 
42 Grant .to McClemand, 14 May 1863, OR, vol. 24, pt. 3: 310. 
43 Sir Arthur James Lyon Fremantle, Three Months in the Southern States, April-June, 1863 
(Mobile, AL: S. H. Goetze!, 1864), 110; Grabau, Ninety-eight Days, 257. 
44 Moore, The Emergence of the Cotton Kingdom, 164. 
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Although Grant's interest in the railroads and their depots may seem like the 
conventional destruction of infrastructure, Grant did not limit his destruction to 
conventional items or buildings. Grant also commanded his troops to destroy all the 
C.S.A. cotton and stores in the city. He wanted to debilitate the city for both the 
Confederate military and civilians. Accordingly, once Jackson had fallen to the Army of 
the Tennessee, troops set out to destroy the Confederacy's communication network.45 
Grant ordered his most-trusted commander, Sherman, to demolish the rail line and 
all the Jackson's depots first. Grant explicitly told Sherman to "designate a brigade from 
[his] command to guard the city. Collect stores and forage, collect all public property of 
the enemy . .. [Direct troops] to commence immediately the effectual destruction of the 
river railroad bridge and the road as far east as possible, as well as north and south ... 
Troops going east of the river should destroy all C.S.A. cotton and stores they find."46 
Grant also instructed Sherman's men to rip up all the rail line within a three to five mile 
radius so that Johnston could not quickly return to the city with reinforcements and attack 
Grant from the rear.47 
While Grant's instructions to destroy the railroad seem like conventional warfare, 
it is important to consider Grant's repetition of the word "all." Grant was not ordering 
Sherman to demolish bridges or roads merely to protect his rear, but to nullify the city. 
Additionally, in spite of earlier occurrences of wanton destruction at the hands of the 
Union Army previously in the campaign, at places such as Holly Springs, Grant did not 
explicitly forbid the demolition or theft of private property. Neither did Grant 
45 Grabau, Ninety-eight Days, 256. 
46 Grant to Sherman, 14 May 1863, OR, vol. 24, pt. 3: 312. Emphasis added. 
47 John Fiske, The Mississippi Valley in the Civil War (New York: Houghton, Mifflin and 
Company, 1900), 179-85. 
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recommend any punishments for soldiers found looting occupied homes, and years after 
the fact neither Grant nor Sherman seemed disturbed by civilian suffering. 
For a successful Vicksburg campaign, Grant needed to incapacitate Jackson so that 
it could not offer any aid to the surrounding areas. He also wanted to move swiftly to 
avoid a major engagement with Pemberton and Johnston's forces. An attack from either 
enemy army could have resulted in a complete rout of Grant's army and ruin the 
campaign.48 Therefore, Grant demanded that Sherman quickly abolish "all possibility of 
aid" at Jackson.49 
Sherman first set out to demolish the railroads. He had his men remove the rail 
ties and pile them before burning them. His soldiers then commenced "twisting the 
rails," making them useless and creating what famously became known as "Sherman's 
neckties."50 According to one of Sherman's men, "it has been determined upon to 
destroy all the railroads within our reach, inflicting damages of such a permanent 
character that they will never be rebuilt, except after a return of peace."51 Sherman 
estimated the devastation's extent at four miles east, three south, three north, and ten 
miles west of Jackson. This was quite an accomplishment. Sherman predicted that the 
railroads would be of " little use to the enemy for six months," and when he returned in 
July the lines were still in disrepair. 52 
While railroad demolition was not uncommon and considered justifiable in war, 
the sanctioned damage's extent is noteworthy. Both Union and Confederate armies 
48 Grant, Memoirs, 232-233; Grimsley, The Hard Hand of War, IO I. 
49 Grant, Memoirs, 265. 
50 Michael B. Dougan, " Hermann Hirsch and the Siege of Jackson," The Journal of Mississippi 
History 53 (February 1991) I: 23; "Colonel Bussy's Expedition," 452. 
46 
"Capture of Jackson, Miss., Battle of Champion Hill Miss., Battle of Black River," Rebellion 
Record: A Diary of American Events: Documents and Narratives (New York: 1864) 6: 352. 
52 OR, vol. 24, pt. I: 754 ; Sherman to Ellen Ewing Sherman, 15 July 1863. 
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wrecked military items during the war. For instance, Johnston removed military material 
from Jackson so that the Union Army would not benefit from it. Johnston, though, was 
unable to take everything and Confederate troops destroyed the remainder. Johnston's 
damage was so drastic that "the opinion prevailed that [Johnston] was destroying the 
whole city."53 With that consideration, "Sherman's neckties" do not seem unusual. 
However, these actions did not merely impede the enemy, but also nullified Jackson as an 
industrial center. The raid not only affected the Confederate military, but also the state's 
residents making Grant's orders and Sherman's actions in Jackson a vital part of their 
nascent hard war strategy. Grant's orders to Sherman illustrate the Union's growing 
acceptance of hard war during the Civil War. 
Easily Converted, Easily Destroyed 
Grant did not limit his attention to the railroads during his 1863 campaign. After 
ordering Sherman to destroy railroads, Grant also demanded his troops to destroy all 
C.S.A. in the city.54 Accordingly, Sherman instructed his troops to make "everything 
public not needed by us" inoperable, which included printing presses, food provisions, 
the city's arsenal, the Government foundry, and a gun-carriage factory. 55 Troops also 
burned five hundred bales of cotton, Phillip's Southern Implement Manufacturing 
Company, the log mill, the flouring mill, the saltpetre works, and "all shops where 
government work was being carried on."56 Troops pillaged all the city's stores - "their 
contents either carried off or thrown in the streets and burned."57 In addition to 
53 
"Capture of Jackson, Miss., Battle of Champion Hill Miss.," 35 1. 
54 Grant to Sherman, 14 May 1863, OR, vol. 24, pt. 3: 312. 
55 Special Order No. I 05, 14 May 1863, OR, vol. 24, pt. 3: 312. 
56 A.J. Frantz, " What the Enemy Did to Jackson in 1863," Brandon Republican, 2 1 May 1863; 
" What the Enemy Did to Jackson"; " Rebel Account of the Destruction of Jackson, Miss.," New York 
Herald, 2 June 1863. 
57 
" Rebel Account." 
Confederate war material and buildings, Union soldiers also raided the Daily 
Mississippian (newspaper) office, the post office, the Governor' s mansion, and Greens' 
bank.58 
13 
Similar to the railroads, private individuals may have owned and managed each of 
these shops. Nonetheless, Sherman insisted that troops damage any buildings or goods 
that "could be easily converted to hostile uses."59 For instance, Phillip's Factory, owned 
by Martin W. Phillips, Z.A. Phillips, and Robert Kells, was the only factory to produce 
wagon and agricultural implements for the entire state of Mississippi. The company's 
steam-powered factories produced both agriculture and military products during the 
war. 
60 Therefore, Grant and Sherman labeled them Confederate property because the 
materials benefitted the enemy' s military.61 
Grant and Sherman's obscure definitions of private and government property 
form a crucial part of their early hard war strategy. Grant and Sherman were not only 
shattering military supplies, but also civilian morale. By ordering their troops to despoil 
any buildings or items that "could be easily converted," Union commanders approved 
excessive destruction and confiscation.62 Union soldiers took advantage of this order and 
ransacked private homes, stole jewelry and clothing, and damaged other non-military 
items.63 
58 
"Rebel Account." 
59 Sherman, Personal Memoirs, 297. 
60 Moore, The Emergence of the Cotton Kingdom, 219-220. In 1861, the factory began to produce 
cannon carriages and caissons by contract with the state of Mississippi. 
6 1 Special Order No. 105, 14 May 1863, OR, vol. 24, pt. 3: 312. 
62 Sherman, Personal Memoirs, 297. 
63 Frantz, "What the Enemy Did to Jackson." 
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Stray Flames, Drunken Soldiers 
While Grant's orders to Sherman only sanctioned the collection of "all public 
property," Union troops did not limit their devastation to military or public buildings. 
During their occupation of Jackson, Sherman's troops damaged or completely leveled 
numerous private, non-war related buildings. The damages included the Roman Catholic 
Church, a Catholic priest's personal home, the state penitentiary, and the Confederate 
Hotel.64 Sherman later recalled that he "never found out exactly who set [the hotel] on 
fire, but [he] was told that in one of our batteries were some officers and men who had 
been made prisoners at Shiloh ... and had been carried to Jackson . . . they had been 
permitted to go this very hotel for dinner," but the landlord refused.65 As retaliation, 
these men most likely burned it. 
While Sherman blamed the Confederate Hotel and Catholic Church's demise on 
his soldiers and "some bad rum found concealed in the stores," he maintained that 
inmates burned the penitentiary.66 With the exception of these buildings, Sherman 
praised Brigadier General Joseph A. Mower's ability to maintain discipline.67 Yet, SCC 
reports reveal the various items taken by Sherman's soldiers, and the Brandon 
Republican (Mississippi) listed many more buildings, private and government owned, 
destroyed or raided.68 For instance, residents also reported that Federal soldiers 
destroyed Shaw's store, Mrs. Blakewell 's house, and Mrs. Sander's boarding house. 
64 Fremantle, Three Months in the Southern States, 110- 111 . 
65 Sherman, Personal Memoirs, 297-298. 
66 Report of Major General William T. Sherman, Fifteenth Army Corps, including Operations 
April 20-May 22, OR, vol. 24, pt. I: 755. 
67 OR, vol. 24, p~. I: 755. 
68 Frantz, "What the Enemy Did to Jackson"; " Interesting From the South: The Occupation of 
Jackson - Davis' Official Organ on Burnside and Vallandigham - Retaliation - Terrible Destruction of 
Property," Cincinnati Daily Gazette, 3 June 1863; " Rebel Account." 
Troops also entered and defaced the Episcopal Church, the local dentist's office, the 
city's bookstore, the drug store, and "broke open" nearly all the private residences.69 
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Sir Arthur James Lyon Fremantle, a European visitor traveling with the 
Confederate Army noted Sherman's demolition. Fremantle did not criticize the Union 
soldiers destruction of the railroads and factories, because they "were of course justified 
in doing so" in warfare. 70 Yet Fremantle did wince when he saw the ruins of the Roman 
Catholic Church, the priest's house, and the principal hotel. He rumored that in the 
thirty-six hour Union occupation, " [Sherman's] troops had wantonly pillaged nearly all 
the private houses. They gutted all the stores, and destroyed what they could not carry 
away."71 Fremantle also affirmed that "many other buildings which could no way be 
identified with the Confederate Government" were smoldering.72 SCC records confirm 
Fremantle ' s observations and noted that troops stole corn, mules, cattle, horses, wagons, 
potatoes, hogs, bacon, fodder, oxen, rice, along with numerous smaller items such as 
chains and bridles in and around the city. Along with draft animals and practical items, 
soldiers also confiscated carpets, quilts, household furniture, clothing, and bedding. 73 A 
telegraph from 16 May fully captures Jackson's devastation: 
Jackson badly sacked, burned Green's factory, Banking houses, all work 
shops, penitentiary, Catholic Church, Confederate House, two hospitals, 
block brick, burnt buildings used as Medical stores, all burnt, all stores 
sacked and contents destroyed, Bank safes broken open, Mississippian 
office gutted, presses broken, type thrown into the streets, Jackson road, 
Southern road torn up badly for several miles all R.R. buildings and 
rolling stock here burned ... Furniture in State House badly abused in 
69 
"Rebel Account." 
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° Fremantle, Thr~e Months in the Southern States, 110. 
71 Fremantle, Three Months in the Southern States, 110-111 . 
72 Fremantle, Three Months in the Southern States, 111. 
73 Alice, Eva, and Herbert L. Petrie Claim, Southern Claims Commission No. 17, 128. 
Governor's Mansion; Demolished Telegraph wires torn down cut for 
several miles. Ladies robbed of jewelry and money. 74 
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In response to this destruction, Jackson's citizens, like Mrs. Ida Barlow Trotter 
depicted Union troops as "blood thirsty men [who] have been playing havoc with both 
life and property in the Central part of the State." She claimed that these men "Had 
destroyed houses, gin houses, and anything that would burn" on their march to and from 
Jackson. 75 Fremantle's diary also reveals that Jackson residents were weary of any 
visitors to the city. For instance, when Fremantle arrived in full British uniform, Jackson 
residents momentarily detained and interrogated him.76 
Edward Fontaine of Jackson wrote, "A victorious army of barbarians is now in 
less than IO miles of me, & a gang of the covetous and blood thirsty scoundrels may be at 
my door at any moment."77 Weeks later when recounting Sherman's activities in 
Jackson, Fontaine additionally conveyed extreme sadness towards the Yankees' capture 
of Jackson and their "destroying [ of] our Railroads, factories, & public stores, ravaging 
the finest portion of the South, destroying thousands of plantations, carrying off stock of 
all sorts, with the poor slaves, & leaving their refined & wealthy owners homeless and 
ruined."78 Rev. John Hunter from the First Presbyterian Church also recorded Union 
soldiers ' actions when he exclaimed "Oh my God! Oh, the horrors if war with an enemy 
robbing and pillaging everywhere ... Today they pillaged my house of many little and 
74 Telegraph Dispatch, 16 May 1863, Mississippi Department of Archives and History, Jackson, 
Mississippi. 
. 
75 
"The Siege of Vicksburg and Some Personal Experiences Connected Therewith," Ida Barlow 
Trotter Papers, Mississ ippi Department of Archives and History, Jackson, Mississippi. 
76 Fremantle, Three Months in the Southern States, I 08. 
77 Bettersworth, "Edward Fontaine, Diary, 4-14 May 1863," Mississippi in the Confederacy, 117. 
78 Bettersworth, " Edward Fontaine, Diary, 29 May 1863," Mississippi in the Confederacy, 122. 
valuable things. One of the robbers presented a pistol at me, but God was my 
d c. d ,, 79 e1en er. 
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Dr. D. W. Yandell's recollections echo Fontaine's and Hunter's complaints about 
Sherman's men's activities. Yandell explained, "Jackson as the seat of government, 
probably received the worst going-over of any city in the state except Vicksburg . . 
.Jackson had its baptism of fire at short range and with careful deliberateness."80 
Yandell' s emphasis on the deliberate nature of the soldiers' actions is significant. Earlier 
in the letter, Yandell contends that the Federal Army's sack of Jackson differed from that 
of Vicksburg, because Vicksburg burned due to "shelling," while Jackson burned "by 
torch."81 President Jefferson Davis echoed this sentiment and recalled that most of the 
latter "laid in ashes."82 Jackson residents estimated the damage at almost five million 
dollars. 83 Jackson's destruction did not result from conventional maneuvers but rather a 
new strategy - hard war. 
Hard War in the Field 
When Sherman returned to Jackson in July to "leave nothing of value for the 
enemy to carry on the war with," he repeated what he had done in May. In July, Sherman 
observed that "their Country is suffering the Scourge of War, and Peace or destruction 
seems their fate. This is a beautiful country, handsome dwellings and plantations, but the 
negroes are gone, houses vacant fields or corn open to the cattle, and our army has 
79 Reverend John Hunter, 14 May 1863, Mississippi Department of Arch ives, Jackson, 
Mississippi. 
80 Bettersworth, "Letter from Dr. D.W. Yandell to John M. Johnson," Mississippi in the 
Confederacy, 202-203. 
8 1 B ettersworth, "Letter from Dr. D. W. Yandell to John M. Johnson," 202-203 . 
82 Bettersworth, "Excerpt from Row land, ed. Jefferson Davis, Constitutionalist," Mississippi in the 
Confederacy, 204. 
83 
" Interesting from the South." 
consumed or is consuming all the cattle, hogs, sheep, chickens, turkies, and vegetables, 
Everything. "84 
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In July, Sherman sent men North to destroy rail lines, he sent cavalry sixty miles 
South to wreak havoc, and kept four thousand men in Jackson to destroy railroads. He 
boasted, "Jackson will never again be a point where our enemy can assemble and threaten 
us on the river." 85 Sherman also exclaimed, "We are absolutely stripping the country of 
corn, cattle, hogs, sheep, poultry, everything. The wholesale destruction to which this 
country is now being subjected is terrible to contemplate, but it is the scourge of war."86 
Sherman then celebrated, "Jackson, once the pride and boast of Mississippi, is now a 
ruined town."87 While the first quote seems like conventional strategy, Sherman' s 
emphasis on his soldiers' destruction of "everything" illustrates that he was becoming 
more comfortable with hard war strategy. 
Sherman's second and the more disastrous Jackson raid was clearly hard war. 
Historian Buckley T. Foster clarified that when Sherman transformed the city into 
"Chimneyville," he was neither directly threatened by the enemy nor in need of supplies 
when his men ransacked the city in July. 88 Rather, Sherman had Johnston on the run and 
many of the railroads remained in a state of disrepair, but as with Grant's earlier assault 
of Jackson, it was best to demolish the city than have it possibly aid the Confederates in 
the future. Moreover, the latter raid operated independent of conventional strategy, 
unlike the May raid. Nevertheless, to completely define hard war as occurring devoid of 
84 Sherman to Ellen Ewing Sherman, 15 July 1863. Proper punctuation added. 
85 Sherman to John Sherman, 19 July 1863. 
86 Sherman to Grant, 14 July 1863, OR, vol. 24, pt. 2: 526 . 
. 
87 Sherman to Porter, 19 July 1863, OR, vol. 24, pt. 3: 531. 
88 Foster, Sherman 's Mississippi Campaign; John K. Bettersworth, "Chimneyville," Mississippi in 
the Confederacy: As They Saw It (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State Un iversity Press, 1961 ) , 202; H. Grady 
Howell Jr. , Chimneyville: "likenesses" of Early Days in Jackson, Mississippi (Madison, MS: Chickasaw 
Bayou Press, 2007). 
conventional military reasons distorts the notion by creating a false dichotomy. In fact, 
Grant himself disclosed that there was no separation between the home fro nt and 
battlefront, or Union policy towards Southern civilians and the Confederate military. 
Grant remarked that the ravaging of enemy supplies "tended to the same result as the 
destruction of armies."89 Therefore, if one abandons this fictional dichotomy, the May 
1863 raid was the workshop in which Grant and Sherman crafted hard war. 
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Sherman would continue large-scale devastation in Meridian. As with Jackson, 
Grant requested that Sherman wreck Meridian' s rail junction.90 Sherman contended that 
such a move, similar to its success in Jackson, would "paralyze" all of Mississippi and 
Mobile, Alabama.91 Sherman aimed to "damage [the roads to Meridian] so that they 
could not be used again for hostile purposes during the rest of the war."92 Sherman's 
troops capably demolished twenty miles of track in less than two days. Sherman also 
oversaw the burning, confiscating, or destruction of anything considered of military value 
or anything that could be easily converted to "hostile uses."93 This included the Pioneer 
Manufacturing Cotton Mill, a small yarn mill, which started operations in Meridian in 
1863.94 As with the Jackson Pearl River Mills, a private individual owned this company 
and moved to Meridian because of its location on the railroad. Unfortunately, also 
similar to the Jackson factory, Sherman would burn the mill.95 
89 Grant, Memoirs, 368-369. 
90 Robert C. Black, III, The Railroads of the Confederacy (Chapel Hi ll : The University of North 
Carolina Press, 1952), 240; Margie Riddle Bearrs, Sherman's Forgotten Campaign: The Meridian 
Expedition (Baltimore: Gateway Press, 1987), 4; Foster, Sherman's Mississippi Campaign, 16. 
91 Sherman to Rawlins, 14 October 1863, OR, vol. 30, pt. 4: 355-356. 
92 Grenville M. Dodge, Personal Recollections of President Abraham Lincoln, General Ulysses S. 
Grant, General William T Sherman (Denver: Sage, 1965), 142-143; Sherman, Personal Memoirs, 363. 
93 Sherman, Personal Memoirs, 297. 
· 
94 Foster, Sherman's Mississippi Campaign, 90. 
95 Foster, Sherman's Mississippi Campaign, 90-1 05. 
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Realizing his efficiency, as Sherman himself boasted at " cleaning out the State of 
Mississippi," he turned his attention towards Atlanta and beyond.96 Sherman determined 
"to get into the interior of the enemy's country as far as you can, inflicting all the damage 
you can against their war resources."97 While marching through the heart of Georgia, 
Sherman would use tactics he and his troops had practiced during the Vicksburg 
campaign. He planned to sack Georgia's major cities while living off the land, exhaust 
General John Bell Hood's forces, burn Atlanta and the state capital, Milledgeville, and 
destroy the state's rail and telegraph lines. 98 Sherman's choice to wreck railroads 
noticeably mirrors his Mississippi operations. 
Sherman's destruction of Columbia, South Carolina was the height of the hard 
war strategy. In Columbia, South Carolina, soldiers ransacked and burned military 
buildings and private homes. According to Historian Charles Royster, some South 
Carolinians claimed that Federal soldiers actively sought out specific homes and victims, 
especially of wealthy Columbians or ardent secessionists.99 Royster further explains that 
the Federal' s 1863 success in Mississippi "converted Sherman to the method of war he 
had been approaching," which he would use in Columbia. 100 Royster labels the entire 
campaign against Mississippi's Gibraltar between December 1862 and 4 July 1863 as the 
period in which Sherman adjusted his conception of warfare. IOI 
96 Foster, Sherman 's Mississippi Campaign, 16-17; Sherman, Personal Memoirs, 364. 
97 Grant to Sherman, 4 April 1865, OR vol. 32, pt. 3: 245-246. 
98
.Joseph Glatthaar, March to the Sea and Beyond: Sherman's Troops in the Savannah and 
Carolinas Campaigns (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1985), 5. 
99 Royster, The Destructive War, 20-21. 
190 Royster, The Destructive War, 115. 
101 Royster, The Destructive War, 110. 
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Conclusion 
With the completed destruction of "all possibility of aid" from Jackson to 
Vicksburg on 14-15 May 1863, Grant and Sherman accepted hard war strategy and 
allowed their troops to confiscate both government and privately owned property, wreck 
miles of rail line, intimidate Southern whites, and forage from the countryside. The 
Army of the Tennessee 's raid on Jackson began the gradual acceptance and use of hard 
war strategy in the American Civil War. After the Vicksburg campaign, Grant and 
Sherman would continue to implement hard war policies during Sherman' s Meridian 
campaign and his destructive march through Georgia and the Carolinas. This change did 
not occur overnight, but over several weeks and for numerous reasons. 
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CHAPTER II 
THE INLAND CAMPAIGN 
The art of war is simple enough. Find out where your enemy is. Get at him as soon as 
you can. Strike him as hard as you can, and keep moving on. 
- Ulysses S. Grant102 
Contemporary newspaperman Lloyd Lewis characterized the Mississippi River as 
"the spinal column of America."103 President Abraham Lincoln also considered the river 
to be the Union's backbone, and with Admiral David G. Farragut's capture of New 
Orleans on 24 April 1862, Lincoln declared, "We can take all the northern ports of the 
Confederacy, and they can defy us from Vicksburg. It means hog and hominy without 
limit, fresh troops from all states of the far South, and a cotton country where they can 
raise the staple without interference."104 Lincoln further insisted, "As valuable as New 
Orleans is to us, Vicksburg will be even more so." 105 Yet, in 1863, Vicksburg still 
dominated this lifeline and prevented Rear Admiral David Dixon Porter, approaching 
from the North, and Farragut in the South from pacifying the city. Therefore, pressured 
by Lincoln, Major General Ulysses S. Grant crafted a new strategy to conquer the city. 
While Grant considered the capture and incapacitation of Jackson vital to his 1863 
Vicksburg campaign, it was not the first step in his emergent hard war program. Rather, 
the Union' s sixty-five mile march across the state's southeastern quadrant and Colonel 
Benjamin H. Grierson's raid through the state from La Grange, Tennessee to Baton 
102 John Hill Brinton, Personal Memoirs of John H. Brinton, Major and Surgeon U.S. V., 186/-
/ 865 (New York: The Neale Publishing Company, 1914), 239. 
103 Terrence J. Winschel, Triumph and Defeat: The Vicksburg Campaign Vol. 2 (New York: Savas 
Beatie LLC, 2006), 74. 
104 D~vid Dixon Porter, Incidents and Anecdotes of the Civil War (New York: D. Appleton and 
Co., 1885), 95-96. . 
105 Porter, Incidents and Anecdotes of the Civil War, 95-96. For more in formation see Terrence J. 
Winschel, "'The Key to Victory': An Overview of the Vicksburg Campaign," http://www.nps.gov/history 
/history/onl ine _ books/gett/gettysburg_seminars/8/essay3.pdf (accessed 12 February 201 2). 
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Rouge, Louisiana inaugurated the new strategy. 106 Grant's march to Jackson and 
Grierson's raid are both fundamental to the Union's early development of hard war 
strategy, and Union policy as a whole, in the American Civil War. The hard war 
approach Federal commanders began to embrace during Grant' s Vicksburg campaign laid 
the foundation for his 1864 Overland campaign and Major General Philip H. Sheridan's 
Shenandoah Valley expedition. Moreover, an analysis of the Union's 1863 Vicksburg 
campaign will provide a greater understanding of the hard war strategy in 1864 and 1865. 
Grant's Plan 
"When it was demonstrated that nature and art had made Vicksburg impregnable 
from the river on its north side," Grant resolved to reach the city from the south. 107 Grant 
required three factors to invade Mississippi and move against the "Gibraltar of the 
Confederacy."108 First, Porter of the United States Navy, commander of the Mississippi 
River Fleet, needed to run his fleet past Vicksburg's guns. 109 During the Civil War, the 
Confederate garrison at Vicksburg dominated the hairpin tum in the Mississippi River 
and their guns on the city's bluffs kept the U.S. Navy from moving past the city. 
Therefore, in mid-April Grant and Porter launched a joint operation to sneak past 
Vicksburg and transport troops into southwest Mississippi to capture the city from the 
rear.110 
106 Moore, The Emergence of the Cotton Kingdom, 167. 
107 OR, vol. 24, pt. 3: 555. 
108 Wi~schel, "'The Key to Victory"; Kevin J. Dougherty, The Campaigns for Vicksburg, 1862-
1863: Leadership Lessons (Philadelphhi; Casemate Publishers, 201 1 ). 
109 Official Records of the Union and Confederate Navies in the War of the Rebel/ion 
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 191 1 ), Series I, vol. 24, 555. 
110 Dougherty, The Campaigns for Vicksburg, 2 1, 26-27; Grant, Memoirs, 236. 
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Porter's " running of the gauntlet" on the nights of 16 and 22 April provided Grant 
with fundamental river support, reliable transportation, and an indispensible diversion. 111 
Grant hoped that Confederate Lieutenant General John C. Pemberton would respond to 
Porter's advance and artillery barrage by fortifying Vicksburg - which Pemberton did. 112 
Additionally, Pemberton reinforced the city with troops from around the state, especially 
from the capital, in response to the surprise Union attack. 113 Pemberton's reallocation of 
troops weakened his Department of Mississippi and East Louisiana (D.M.E.L.) and 
provided Grant with sufficient time to march his three corps from northern Mississippi, 
through Louisiana at Milliken's Bend, and south to flank Vicksburg. 
This operation was also dependent on Pemberton's reaction to a second factor -
Sherman 's maneuvers against Haynes' Bluff and Chickasaw Bayou. In response to the 
enemy reinforcing the Gulf, Grant instructed Sherman to make a feint above Vicksburg 
along the Yazoo River. 114 Sherman remarked later, "we aided much in passing the 
necessary fleet of boats below Vicksburg, and when the first battle was to begin at Grand 
Gulf we had the important but ungrateful task of deceiving out enemy by a feigned attack 
on Haynes' Bluff."115 Grant intended the simulated attack to persuade Pemberton to 
further fortify the city while his Union troops moved into Mississippi. 116 Grant then 
11 1 OR, vol. 24, pt. 3: 15 1- 152; Grant, Memoirs, 250. 
112 Pemberton to Cooper, 17 April 1863, OR, vol. 24 , pt. 3: 75 1; Pemberton to Johnston, 17 Apri l 
1863, OR, vol. 24, pt. 3: 75 1-752. 
11 3 Pemberton to Johnston, 17 April 1863, OR, vol. 24, pt. 3: 75 1-753. 
114 McClernand to Grant, 26 Apri l 1863, OR, vol. 24, pt. 3: 234; O.H. Matz, "Map of the Country 
Between Mill iken's Bend, LA and Jackson, Miss. showing the Routes followed by the Army ofTennessee 
Under the Command of Major General U.S. Grant. U.S. Volunteers. In its March from Milliken's Bend to 
the Rear of Vicks.burg in Apri l and May 1863, compiled, surveyed, and drawn under the Direction of Lt. 
Colone!James H. Wilson, A.LG. and I" Lt. Engineers" (Washington D.C.: Office of the Chief of 
Engineers U.S. Army, 1876). 
I 15 OR, vol. 24, pt. 3: 555. 
116 McClernand to Grant, 26 April 1863, OR, vol. 24, pt. 3: 234. 
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expected Sherman to form the left wing towards Jackson. 117 Fortunately, Sherman's 
April 1863 "feint or diversion was perfectly successful , and for weeks [he and his corps] 
succeeded admirably in confusing and deceiving the enemy as to [their] purposes, and 
contributed largely thereby in gaining a successful foothold on land below Vicksburg."118 
Sherman's attack was so convincing that Pemberton believed Grant's river 
crossing was the trick and Sherman's was the real attack. For instance, Brigadier General 
John S. Bowen cautioned, "all the movements of the enemy during the last twenty-four 
hours [26-27 April] seem to indicate an intention on their part to march their army still 
lower down in Louisiana, perhaps to Saint Joseph, and then to run their steamers by me 
and cross to Rodney [Mississippi]." 11 9 However, Pemberton did not send troops south. 
As a result, he harmed his defense of the city. Bowen had miscalculated Grant' s landing 
by only ten miles, and due to Pemberton' s disregard, Grant's twenty-two thousand men 
crossed the river on 30 April without Confederate resistance. 120 
Along with Porter and Sherman's moves, Grant expected Major General Stephen 
A. Hurlbut and Colonel Benjamin H. Grierson to provide assistance. Although Grant left 
Hurlbut in Memphis to defend against Confederate cavalry, Grant had him plan a deep-
penetration raid into Mississippi 's center. 121 Grant believed that a large cavalry force 
would "ensure their success in reaching the road east of Jackson," and safeguard the 
117 Special Orders No. 110, 20 April 1863, OR, vol. 24, pt. 3: 213 . 
118 0 R, vol. 24, pt. 3: 555 . 
119 Bowen to Memminger, 27 April 1863, OR, vol. 24, pt. 3: 792-93 ; Christopher R. Gabel, " Battle 
Command Incompetencies: John C. Pemberton in the Vicksburg Campaign," Studies in Battle Command. 
Faculty Combat St1:,1dies Institute, http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/cgsc/carl/ 
resources/csi/battles/battles.asp#VII (accessed 24 January 20 12). 
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- Grant to Halleck, 3 May 1863, OR, vol. 24, pt. I: 32; Gabel, " Battle Command 
Incompetencies." · 
121 Grabau, Ninety-eight Days, 112-113. 
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Vicksburg campaign. 122 Therefore, in March 1863, Grant ordered Hurlbut to prepare 
"the available cavalry put in as good condition as possible in the next few weeks for 
heavy service." 123 For his third measure, Grant ordered Grierson's 1,700-man cavalry 
raid to begin on 17 April. 124 Grierson's main column left La Grange, Tennessee towards 
Hazlehurst, Mississippi. Additionally, in an effort to confuse Pemberton, smaller parties 
dispersed in various directions. 125 Grant intended the raid not only to occupy Pemberton, 
but also to incapacitate the state, while his Union troops moved into southwestern 
Mississippi. 
With Porter's naval assaults, Sherman's feint, and Grierson's raid, Pemberton 
thought everything was happening at once. 126. Supposing that Grant was planning 
another offensive against the bluff city, Pemberton hastily reinforced Vicksburg. 127 
Grant's ploys so disoriented Pemberton that when General Joseph E. Johnston requested 
Pemberton send more troops to Colonel Phillip Roddey, Pemberton not only refused, but 
also requested that Johnston send him troops to protect against Grant's attack. 128 After 
successfully confusing Pemberton, Grant crossed at Bruinsburg on 30 April 1863. 129 
Grant's Army 
To be successful, Grant needed each of his corps commanders - Major General 
William Tecumseh Sherman's XV Corps, Major General James McPherson 's XVII 
Corps, and, in the lead, Major General John A. McClemand's XIII Corps - to work as 
122 Grant to Hurlbut, 9 March 1863, OR, vol. 24, pt. 3:95. 
123 Grant to Hurlbut, 9 March 1863, OR, vol. 24, pt. 3 :95. 
124 Grabau, Ninety-eight Days, 11 3. 
125 Dougherty, The Campaigns for Vicksburg, 3 1. · 
126 Pemberton to Davi s, 18 April 1863, OR, vol. 24, pt. 3: 760. Along with these grand measures, 
Union tr~~fs a lso att_acked Greenville in the ~ississippi Delta. 
Stevenson to Pemberton, 17 Apn l 1863, OR, vol. 24, pt. 3: 756-757. 
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129 Adams to Pemberton, 13 May 1863, OR, vol. 24, pt. 3: 870. 
one. Although Grant left Major General Stephen A. Hurlbut and the XVI Corps near 
Memphis to protect the vulnerable communication lines, Grant required him to 
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contribute. But, success depended especially on the XIII and XVII corps. 130 Grant 
initially ordered McPherson and McClernand's divisions to scout the road to Jackson. 
However, with the arrival of Sherman' s XV Corps on 7 May, Grant placed McClernand's 
XIII Corps farther south along the Big Black River, which was Pemberton's Army's main 
supply line. Grant intended this as a distraction and hoped that Pemberton would divide 
his Confederate forces further, which Pemberton did. Then, with their respective orders 
- McPherson's corps by the left via Clinton, Sherman by the right-hand road though 
Mississippi Springs, and McClernand's troops through Edward' s Ferry at the center -
Grant advanced on Jackson.131 
Grant's Acceptance of Hard War 
Grant' s transition to hard war was a two-step process. The first step was Grant's 
choice to abandon his supply line from Grand Gulf to Jackson and live off the land until 
Union troops could locate another secure base.132 Determined to retrieve adequate 
provisions, Grant allocated a substantial number of his men to locate provisions and 
supplies along the Big Black River. Secondly, Grant ordered troops to destroy the public 
property in Mississippi's capital. 133 These steps began the evolution of the Union's 
emerging hard war program, discouraged Southern civilians loyal to the Confederacy, 
and weakened Mississippi's economy, all in fifteen days. 
130 OR, vol. I:" 46; Grant, Memoirs, 262; Grabau, Ninety-eight Days, 60. 
131 Grant, Memoirs, 234, 254; Sherman, Personal Memoirs, 296-297. 
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For Grant's offensive, Union soldiers needed to move swiftly across Mississippi, 
divide Pemberton's forces, and sack Jackson before the Confederate garrison removed 
their materials to safety. This required either a long supply line from Grand Gulf to 
Jackson or no supply line at all. The former demanded constant protection from 
Confederate raiders, because an attack could have ruined the entire campaign. 134 Grant 
had already learned this lesson in December of 1862, when Brigadier General Nathan 
Bedford Forrest's raiders and Major General Earl Van Dom's cavalry struck his supply 
lines. This devastating attack, in which Van Dom burned $1,500,000 worth of stores, 
forced Grant to forage until his lines could be repaired.135 Leaming from this experience, 
Grant observed, "[Van Dom's raid] demonstrated the impossibility of maintaining so 
long a line of road over which to draw supplies for an army moving in an enemy's 
country."136 One historian argued that Forrest and Van Dom's raids made Grant 
knowledgeable of foraging' s benefits, which he implemented during his 1863 Inland 
campaign. 137 
This threat, compounded with his inability to spare troops for guard duty and the 
Federal government's growing acceptance of hard war with General Order No. 100, 
persuaded Grant to embrace hard war and abandon his supply lines. Initially, Grant 
aimed to use Grand Gulf, Mississippi as a base since it was on the main road to Jackson. 
However, Grant was still approximately sixty miles from the capital and companies 
134 Grant, Mem.oirs, 232-233 ; Grimsley, The Hard Hand of War, 101. 
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constantly running along a supply line possibly jeopardized the campaign. 138 Therefore, 
Grant abandoned the town and embraced early hard war strategy. 139 
Major General Halleck in Washington, as well as Sherman, initially cautioned 
against Grant's decision to abandon Grand Gulf as a base. In spite of General Order No. 
l OO 's obscure language, the government still did not officially condone mass foraging 
and Halleck believed that the land could not sustain thirty-three thousand men. Grant 
understood their apprehension, but seeing foraging's success in 1862 and out of necessity 
he had his troops "get up what rations of hard bread, coffee, and salt we can, and make 
the country furnish the balance."140 
The Inland campaign was not the first time Grant contemplated mass pillaging. In 
October 1862, he asked Sherman about the possibility of launching raids on Confederate 
property, such as farms, plantations, railroads, and factories. Sherman responded, "We 
cannot change the hearts of those people in the South, but we can make war so terrible 
that they will realize the fact that however brave and gallant and devoted to their country, 
still they are mortal and should exhaust all peaceful remedies before they fly to war." 141 
During this time, Sherman was beginning to shape his hard war strategy in response to 
his growing frustration with guerrilla attacks. While in Memphis, for instance, Sherman 
remarked, "The Government of the United States may now safely proceed on the proper 
Rule that all in the South are Enemies of all in the North" and "as to changing the 
opinions of the People of the South that is impossible, and they must be killed or 
138 Grant, Memoirs, 258-259. 
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dispossessed." 142 Sherman added, "We have finished the first page of this war in vainly 
seeking a union sentiment in the South ... and are about Entering on a Second period. 
Those who sought political advantage by a display of military Zeal have disappeared 
from the Field of action, and now will begin the real struggle of conquest. Negro 
property and personal property are fair subjects of conquest, as also the possession of 
Real Estate during the lives of present owners." 143 Although, neither Sherman nor Grant 
encouraged mass foraging in 1862, their understanding of conventional military strategy 
began to shift in 1863 . They would first embrace the new strategy of hard war during the 
Vicksburg campaign. 
Grant's Offensive 
During his Inland campaign Grant expected all of his men to forage. Grant 
needed to feed and supply his troops without delay - a delay would only give the enemy 
time to reinforce, fortify, and prepare - he did not have that option. Union officers sent 
official detachments to plantations along the Big Black River to confiscate wagons, draft 
animals, and other livestock. While foraging Federal troops also implemented a denial 
policy, which meant that if they could not completely use or transport all the stores, they 
destroyed them. Grant hoped these actions would cripple Confederate morale. 144 
During their march Federal soldiers ravaged many homes and farms for supplies. 
Mississippians reported the loss of thousands of dollars worth of goods. 145 For instance, 
one plantation owner recorded that Grant's Army, specifically the soldiers from Illinois 
142 Sherman to Salmon P. Chase, 11 August 1862, Brooks D. Simpson and Jean V. Berlin, 
Sherman's Civil War: Selected Correspondence of William T. Sherman, 1860-1865 (Chapel Hill: The 
University ofNorth Carolii:ia Press, 1999), 269; Sherman to Thomas Ewing Sherman, IO August 1862, 
Sherman's Civil War, 263. 
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144 Grant, Memoirs , 26 1. 
145 Grant, Memoirs, 262. 
and Ohio, confiscated $29,855 .00 in property on 4 May 1863 alone. In this one day, 
soldiers took loads of corn, bacon, fodder, lumber, fence rails, wagon gears, and the 
plantation wagon. Along with these foodstuffs, soldiers took fifteen mules, two horses, 
forty sheep, fifteen milk cows, twenty-five cattle, ten oxen, and one hundred hogs. 
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Additionally, Union soldiers allegedly confiscated all the available cotton on the 
property. The owner's claim illustrates that the soldiers must have thoroughly searched 
for cotton, because they took cotton from "under" and "in the gin," from the old seed 
house, and the fodder house. Along with taking these 120 bales of cotton, soldiers also 
burned fifteen bales found in a bin rather than leave it to the civilians or the Confederate 
military. Union troops took or attempted to burn everything available, and the owner was 
only able to save forty bales of cotton from the fire. 146 While it seemed as if this 
plantation prospered before the Union Army's arrival, Union troops clearly left it 
destitute with Grant's decision to abandon his supply line and have his men forage for 
prov1s10ns. 
For instance, Grant's 1863 warning against the "wanton destruction of property, 
taking of articles, unless for military purposes, insulting citizens, [and] going into and 
searching houses without proper orders from division commanders" includes the clause 
"without proper orders."147 The added clause indicates that as long as Union officers 
follow protocol, they could order the destruction of private property. For example, with 
146 
" List of Stock a~d Property Taken by Grant's Army from an Unidentified Mississippi 
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Grant's permission, Brigadier General Frederick Steele ordered the sacking of Deer 
Creek, Mississippi in April 1863 in response to an increase in guerilla activities. 148 
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According to Sherman, guerillas considered Greenville to be a "favorite point in 
which to assail our boats ."149 Therefore, Grant and Sherman directed Steele to " let the 
planters and inhabitants on Deer Creek see and feel that they will be held accountable for 
the acts of guerillas and Confederate soldiers who sojourn in their country."150 
Additionally, "If planters remain at home and behave themselves, molest them as little as 
possible, but if the planters abandon their plantations, you may infer they are hostile, and 
can take their cattle, hogs, com, and anything you need." 15 1 Sherman further noted, "All 
provisions which are needed by us or might be used by the army in Vicksburg, unless 
needed by the peaceful inhabitants, should be brought away, used by your men, or 
destroyed." 152 
On 11 April, Grant additionally informed Steele, "Rebellion has assumed that 
shape now that it can only terminate by the complete subjugation of the South or the 
overthrow of the Government. . .it is our duty therefore to use every means to weaken the 
enemy be destroying their means of cultivating their field, and in every other way 
possible."153 Accordingly, Steele confiscated "thousand head of stock, horses, mules and 
beef cattle ... a number of ox, wagons, carts, buggies, &c."154 Steele also celebrated that 
his men burned everything there was to eat on the plantations and his officers estimated 
that his troops burned five hundred thousand bushels of com, and that at least twenty-five 
148 Special Orders No. I 10, 20 April 1863, OR, vol. 24, pt. 3: 2 13; Ballard, Vicksburg, 2 10-211. 
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thousand of those were destined for Vicksburg. Along with hitting the Thompsons ' 
plantation, Steele also attacked the Frenches' plantation and burned several bridges. 155 
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An Illinois chaplain praised Steele when he saw the "charred remains of the once pleasant 
little village ... This is the point where the guerrillas have been committing depredations 
for sometime past." 156 The town's destruction signifies the Union's acceptance of hard 
war within a structured strategy as the Union' s General Order No. 100 introduced. 
For example, in late April 1863 Major General McPherson limited foraging to 
sanctioned parties only after he saw soldiers shattering private furniture not for firewood, 
but to simply terrorize a family during the Inland campaign. 157 Similarly, Sherman 
considered the useless destruction of private property, such as portraits, unjustifiable in 
warfare. 158 Sherman, like McPherson, thought that needless raiding harmed the troops' 
morals. Nonetheless, Sherman did not seem too vexed about such actions and after 
witnessing such destruction he briefly commented, " I fear the house & contents will be 
burned by the stragglers of my corps, but we are moving in the wrong direction to save 
anything."159 Therefore, by spring 1863 Union officers began to disregard their soldiers ' 
raids of unoccupied homes, the homes of hostile civilians, and to destroy or confiscate 
enemy property. 
For instance, on 6 May 1863 Sherman admitted, "Of course I expect & do take 
com, bacon, horses, mules, and everything to support an army, and dont [sic] object 
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much to the using fences for firewood." 16° Confederate soldiers and Southern guerillas 
could have benefitted from these items if not confiscated or destroyed. Therefore, 
Sherman considered these actions justifiable in warfare and would continue to implement 
them in 1864 and 1865. For instance in 1864, Sherman declared, "When men take up 
arms to resist a rightful authority, we are compelled to use like force ... When the 
provisions, forage, horses, mules, wagons, etc., are used by our enemy, it is clearly our 
duty and right to take them also, because otherwise they might be used against us. In like 
manner all houses left vacant by an inimical people are clearly our right, and as such are 
needed as storehouses, hospitals, and quarters." 161 
Doomed to Fail 
Due to his diversions, Grant's march into Mississippi was relatively easy. 
Although Pemberton had upwards of fifty thousand men, these troops were not easily 
assembled or, as military historian Christopher Gabel argues, " led decisively." 162 In fact, 
as a result of the Union Army's multiple schemes, Pemberton spread his troops so 
haphazardly that at the Battle of Jackson only six thousand Confederate troops were in 
the city. 163 To make matters worse, when Pemberton heard of Grant's incursion, 
Jackson ' s fortifications remained unfinished and reinforcements were days away. 164 
Along with ignoring his subordinates' warnings - Pemberton had already 
disregarded Brigadier General John S. Bowen's warnings that Grant had crossed the river 
- Pemberton was slow to adjust. In spite of frequent reports of Grant's assault against 
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Grand Gulf on 29 April, Pemberton failed to send reinforcements to confront Grant. 
When Pemberton finally left his Jackson headquarters on I May, he did not advance 
south towards Grant, but rather west towards Vicksburg. Due to Pemberton's poor 
choices, Union forces at Port Gibson outnumbered Bowen's forces three to one. 165 
Furthermore, most of the state's troopers remained scattered across the northern part of 
the state. Consequently, Pemberton's choice to abandon Jackson endangered the capital, 
trapped his troops in Vicksburg, and resulted in the city's surrender on 4 July 1863. 
Grierson's Raid 
Grant's Inland campaign also acted as a rehearsal for his 1864 Overland campaign 
in the Eastern Theater.166 Historians recognize the latter as a relentless campaign to 
defeat the Army of Northern Virginia and to take Richmond. However, 1864 was not the 
first time Grant waged this type of warfare. Rather, his later Overland campaign 
resembles his earlier push for Vicksburg. For example, a main asset of his 1864 
campaign was Major General Philip H. Sheridan's destruction of the Shenandoah Valley. 
This later operation echoes Colonel Benjamin H. Grierson's raid through Mississippi as 
part of Grant's 1863 Vicksburg campaign, which was a fundamental step in the strategy 
of hard war's evolution. 
Realizing that he required multiple plans to take Vicksburg, on 13 February 1863 
Grant declared, " It seems to me that Grierson with about 500 picked men, might 
succeed ... The undertaking would be a hazardous one, but would pay well if carried out. 
I do not direct that shall be done, but leave it for a volunteer enterprise." 167 Grant 
determined this undertaking to sidetrack Pemberton and Van Dorn from the Mississippi 
165 Gabel, "Battle Command Incompetenc ies." 
166 Ballard, Vicksburg. 
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Central Railroad. Therefore, on 10 April Grant informed Hurlbut to "strike out by way of 
Pontotoc, breaking right and left, cutting both roads, destroying the wires, burning 
provisions, and doing all the mischief they can, while one regiment ranges straight down 
to Selma or Meridian, breaking the east and west road thoroughly, and swinging back 
through Alabama."168 Believing Colonel Benjamin H. Grierson to be the best officer for 
the job, Hurlbut sent him a telegraph on 13 April, "Return Immediately." 169 
Although Grierson knew that neither Grant nor Hurlbut told him the whole plan, 
he recognized that his order was important to the Vicksburg campaign. 170 Grant 
understood that cutting the railroads would distract Pemberton and provide Grant with 
enough time to launch his grand offensive. Grant expected Grierson "to destroy railroads 
and other public property, for the purpose of creating a diversion in favor of the army 
moving to the attack on Vicksburg." 171 Consequently, Grierson' s success would 
determine Union strategy in the Western Theater. 172 
Grierson boarded the train from Memphis to La Grange on 16 April and wrote to 
his wife, "My command is ordered to leave ... you must not be alarmed should you not 
hear from me inside a month. "173 After discussing his plan with General William Sooy 
Smith, Grierson issued orders for "light rations" to his brigade and on 17 April, Grierson 
led 1,700 men from La Grange towards the his main objectives - the Mobile and Ohio 
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and Mississippi Central railroads. 174 Shortly after Grierson's departure, Hurlbut launched 
several smaller raids to detract attention from Grierson's party, so that the latter could hit 
the railroads quickly. 175 
For instance, before Grierson reached New Albany on the 18 April, Hurlbut had 
four other missions underway. 176 Brigadier General Sooy Smith and his fifteen hundred 
men marched southwest from La Grange, while five thousand men from Corinth marched 
east toward Tuscumbia. 177 Another force of thirteen hundred marched towards Panola, 
Mississippi to confront Confederate Brigadier General James Chalmers' forces, while 
Colonel Abel Streight launched his raid into Alabama. 178 All of these supporting 
expeditions served their purpose and Grierson's command met no opposition on the first 
day and traveled thirty miles to Ripley, Mississippi. 179 
Grierson's success continued and on 19 April, he attacked Pontotoc, 
Mississippi.180 Here, Grierson's men employed hard war strategy and captured a large 
mill, about four hundred bushels of salt and camp equipage, books, and papers. 181 Along 
with Grierson's hard war achievements, Colonel Edward Hatch also made headways 
through Mississippi. For instance, on 20 April, Hatch cut the Mobile and Ohio Railroad 
at West Point. 182 Along with wrecking the rail lines, Grierson also instructed Hatch to 
destroy "all public property as far South as possible ... if practicable, take Columbus and 
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destroy all Government works." 183 After causing significant devastation, Hatch's men 
unfortunately encountered Confederate Lieutenant Colonel C.R. Barteau's cavalrymen at 
Palo Alto, Mississippi and retreated northward. 184 During his retreat, though, Hatch 
continued to implement the early hard war strategy and destroyed a large amount of 
provisions at Okolona and Tupelo. 185 As a supporting role to Grierson ' s overall raid, 
Hatch was quite effective in destroying both military and non-military items. 186 
Even with the Union's raids into enemy territory, Pemberton still regarded this 
action to be "a mere raid," and did not send a large force to intercept them. 187 The Daily 
Mississippian commented on Pemberton' s negligence, "We have information that the 
enemy entered Brookhaven yesterday evening, burnt the railroad depot, cut the wires, and 
after doing what other damage they pleased, leisurely retired (a portion of them at least) 
in an easterly direction." 188 
Since Hatch preoccupied Barteau in the state 's northern sector and Pemberton 
remained unconvinced, Grierson was able to launch a devastating push towards 
Starkville, Mississippi on 22 April, where he burned all of the town's government 
property. 189 After Starkville, Grierson detached Major John Graham's battalion to 
Bankston, Mississippi to destroy a large tannery and shoe factory on 26 April. 190 As with 
Grierson's own success, Graham captured a Confederate quartermaster and machinery. 
183 Grierson to Rawlins, OR, vol. 24, pt. I: 523. 
184 Pemberton to Reynolds, 27 Apri l 1863, OR, vol. 24, pt. 3: 794; Grabau, Ninety-eight Days, 
120. 
185 OR, vol. 24, pt. I: 555. Hatch safely retuned to La Grange on 26 April. 
186 Grabau, Ninety-eight Days, 114. 
187 Pemberton to Ruggles, 20 Apri l 1863, OR, vol. 24, pt. 3: 770; Hurlbut to Rawlins, 20 April 
1863, OR, vol. 24, pt. 3: 2 14-2 15. 
188 Daily Mississippian, 30 Ap~il 1863. 
189 Pemberton to Johnston, 22 April 1863, OR, vol. 24, pt. 3: 776; Grierson to Rawlins, OR, vol. 
24, pt. I: 523. 
190 Ruggles to Loring, 26 April 1863, OR, vol. 24, pt. 3: 79 1; Grierson to Rawlins, OR, vol. 24, pt. 
I: 522. 
Additionally, the Union cavalrymen captured $50,000 worth of shoes, boots, leather, 
saddles, and bridles for Vicksburg and Port Gibson's Confederate garrisons. 191 
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Along with Hatch and Graham, Grierson detached another small force to strike 
the railroad at Macon, Mississippi. 192 While Captain Henry Forbes led this separate 
operation, Grierson advanced on the Southern Mississippi Railroad at Newton Station via 
Louisville. 193 Although Grierson had implemented destructive warfare throughout his 
entire raid up to this point, here Grierson issued strict orders to "drive out stragglers, 
preserve order, and quiet the fears of the people." 194 Most likely to the residents' relief, 
the Federal cavalrymen passed through the town without incident. 
Grierson considered Newton Station his primary objective. 195 Here, he destroyed 
two locomotives, twenty-five freight cars loaded with commissary stores and 
ammunition, including artillery shells bound for Vicksburg, additional stores and five 
hundred muskets. 196 Along with these military items, Edward Fontaine of Jackson 
declared, "They have cut the telegraph at Lake in Newton Co. & burnt Newton Station. 
Nothing proves more fully the incompetency of our Generals than the miserable 
disposition of the forces appointed to defend the State. This raid is the most successful 
the Yankees have yet made, and is a disgrace to our State. Nothing that I can discover 
interferes with their taking the city of Jackson."197 When Grierson learned that 
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Pemberton was busy reinforcing Jackson and points eastward, he moved southwest to hit 
the New Orleans, Jackson & Great Northern Railroad at Hazlehurst. 198 
When news reached Jackson that "a large Yankee force of cavalry 2, or 3,000 
strong have swept down the country as far as Lodi in Choctaw County west of 
Columbus," Pemberton diverted a division's worth of men to intercept the Union 
raiders. 199 This act further weakened Pemberton' s already scattered forces and his choice 
to detach several of Bowen's companies only made matters worse. Even with 
Pemberton' s attempt to hinder the Federal raid, on 26 April Grierson continued to 
Raleigh across the Leaf River, where his men captured the county sheriff and confiscated 
$3,000 in Confederate government funds.200 Then, Grierson headed for Hazlehurst, 
where he attacked the railroad, burned a string of boxcars, and most of the town.20 1 
While Grierson was mostly targeting military item s, his nonchalant response to pillaging 
and private property destruction, similar to Grant's and Sherman's response one month 
later in Jackson, demonstrate that Union commanders were gradually accepting hard war 
strategy as an alternative way to subdue the Confederacy. 
When Pemberton heard of Hazlehurst, he commented, "All the cavalry I can raise 
is close on their rear," and instructed Colonel Wirt Adam 's cavalry to capture the Yankee 
cavalry.202 Considering the possibility of being overwhelmed by Confederates, Grierson 
headed towards Baton Rouge. With the Confederates in pursuit, Grierson ordered 
Colonel Reuben Loomis to head westward toward Fayette and then to Brookhaven. 
Although temporarily fooled by Loomis' feint toward Fayette, Adams and Colonel R. V. 
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Richardson's cavalry were gaining on Brookhaven - where Grierson burned the depot 
and several freight cars. 203 Yet, even with this constant threat, Hurlbut assured Rawlins, 
"I have no doubt of Grierson's success."204 The Jackson Appeal echoed Hurlbut's 
prediction and reported on 28 April, "The penetration of an enemy's country however, so 
extensively, will be recorded as one of the greatest feats of the war, no matter whether the 
actors escaped or were captured."205 
On 30 April, Grierson resumed his destruction. At Bogue Chitto Station, 
Mississippi, for example, he burned fifteen freight cars and the depot. He destroyed an 
additional twenty-five freight cars and a large store of government sugar at Summit, 
Mississippi. Yet, with Confederate resistance building, Grierson decided to take the road 
to Baton Rouge on 1 May, and just sixteen days after he left La Grange, Grierson led his 
troopers into the city.206 
According to Hurlbut, "our gallant soldier Grierson proceeded with his command 
unchallenged, and has splendidly performed the duty he was sent upon."207 Grierson 
himself claimed to have killed and wounded one hundred Confederates, captured five 
hundred, destroyed between fifty and sixty miles of railroad, destroyed over three 
thousand arms, captured one thousand horses and mules, and covered six hundred miles, 
all in sixteen days.208 Along with these items, Harper's Weekly estimated that Grierson 
also destroyed four million dollars worth of stores and property.209 At Sandy Creek 
alone, Grierson destroyed and captured fifty tents, "a large quantity of ammunition, guns, 
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public and private stores, books, papers, and public documents."210 Similar to his capture 
of Pontotoc, Grierson's choice to destroy both public and private property illustrates hard 
war's development in 1863. 
Grant celebrated Grierson 's achievement with "Colonel Grierson's raid from La 
Grange through Mississippi has been the most successful thing of the kind since the 
breaking out of the rebellion." Even Southerners referred to it as "one of the most daring 
exploits of the war."21 1 Grierson himselfrecalled, "no one can pass through that country 
without knowing that the Confederacy is broken up. It is a mere shell with nothing in 
it."212 Bolstering Grierson' s claims of success, one of Grant' s informants exclaimed, 
"Grierson has knocked the heart out of the State."213 But nothing sums up Grierson's 
success more than Jackson' s own Daily Mississippian in this article from 30 April 1863: 
Well, well! We are free to admit that Mr. (we beg his pardon) Colonel 
Grierson and his boys have had a "good time of it" for the last week. It is 
actually amusing to think (although, we confess, annoying) how they have 
roved around, within forty or fifty miles of the capitol of the State - eating 
fried ham and eggs and broiled spring chickens every morning for 
breakfast, at the expense of the planters whom they choose to honor with a 
visit - luxuriating on fat mutton, green peas and ( of course) strawberries 
and cream for dinner- and all this without caring for the terrible fact 
(confound their impudence) that they were within a few hours ride of 
Lieutenant General John C. Pemberton's headquarters, or thinking for an 
instant that the commander-in-chief of the "State Troops" lived, moved, 
breathed and had his being in the city of Jackson. It is actually provoking 
to think how Colonel (we mean Brigadier General - begging his pardon) 
Grierson and his jolly riders have enjoyed themselves for a whole week ... 
We hope Maj. Gen Grierson (we have a penchant for long military titles) 
will not take off the wires of the telegraph as he proceeds - for, as it seems 
he can't be caught or headed off, we feel some curiosity to be regularly 
informed of his where abouts.214 
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Sheridan's Shenandoah Valley Campaign 
As Grant used Grierson to aid his Inland campaign, Grant would also order Major 
General Philip H. Sheridan to deny General Robert E. Lee supplies and reinforcements 
during his 1864 Overland campaign. Believing the Army of the Potomac's failures 
extended from their inability to work with other Northern armies, Grant coordinated the 
two Federal armies towards one goal - denying Confederate armies support and 
supplies.21 5 Grant expected the two periphery armies - Benjamin Butler's Army of the 
James and Franz Sigel's forces in West Virginia, - to support Grant and Major General 
George S. Meade's operations in Virginia. 
Grant demanded Sigel and Butler to cut Lee's supply and communication lines. 
By denying the Army of Northern Virginia valuable supplies Grant incorporated strategy 
he first began in Mississippi. Grant hoped that these armies would accomplish what he 
had in Mississippi. However, both Butler and Sigel failed. In response, Grant ordered 
Major General Philip H. Sheridan to devastate the Shenandoah Valley. 
On 6 August 1864, Lincoln promoted Sheridan to commander of the newly 
created Army of the Shenandoah - composed of two divisions from Louisiana and two 
divisions from Sheridan's own cavalry. Frustrated with Sheridan's predecessors' 
performances, Grant ordered him to go after Lieutenant General Jubal Early, "follow him 
to the Death," and then turn "the Shenandoah Valley [into] a barren waste . . . so that 
crows fl ying over it for the balance of this season will have to carry their provender with 
215 McPherson, The Battle Cry of Freedom, 722. 
44 
them."216 Union soldiers had already destroyed a great deal more than military property, 
which did not seem to bother Grant, and Sheridan's raids were far more devastating. 217 
By 7 October 1864 Sheridan reported that his troops had "destroyed over 2,000 
barns filled with wheat, hay, and farming implements; over seventy mills filled with flour 
and wheat; have driven in front of the army over 4,000 head of stock, and have killed and 
issued to the troops not less than 3,000 sheep."218 Proud of their success, some of 
Sheridan 's soldiers described themselves as "barn burners" and "destroyers of homes."219 
With this expedition, Union troops took the war directly to the Southern women and 
children. 
Attrition 
Besides raiding private homes, Grant' s Eastern Theater operations mirror hi s 
smaller Mississippi campaign in maneuver. For example, his push for Vicksburg 
involved five battles in quick succession - Port Gibson (l May), Raymond (12 May), 
Jackson (14 May), Champion Hill (16 May), and Big Black River (17 May) - and 
concluded with the Vicksburg siege. Likewise, his 1864 Overland campaign included 
four battles - The Wilderness (5-7 May), Spotsylvania Court House (8-21 May), North 
Anna River (23-26 May), and Cold Harbor (31 May-12 June)- and ended with the 
Petersburg siege. 220 While this may seem coincidental, it is not the number of battles that 
is remarkable but the intervals between them. 
As historian Joan Waugh reveals, armies adopted cultural traits. The Army of the 
Tennessee, especially with Grant 's 1862 victories at Forts Henry and Donelson, 
216 McPherson, The Battle Cry of Freedo_m, 758, 778. 
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developed an "aggressive ... 'can-do' attitude," while the Army of the Potomac was timid 
and cautious. 22 1 Before Grant's arrival in the East, the Army of the Potomac and the 
Army of Northern Virginia took extended breaks between large engagements. However, 
with Grant's promotion to Lieutenant General and his arrival in the East, he would force 
the Army of the Potomac to maintain the offensive. 
For example, after the bloody 1864 Battle of the Wilderness, Grant did not retreat, 
but instead moved southeast to flank Lee. This drive mirrors Major General 
McPherson ' s 1863 movement towards Jackson in spite of his engagement at Raymond. 
There was no time to be lost in recovering. The Battle of Raymond occurred on 11 May 
1863, three days before the Battle of Jackson, and although McPherson suffered 
approximately four hundred casualties at Raymond, he moved quickly into the city before 
Gregg and Johnston could reinforce.222 Between 1 May and 17 July 1863, Grant 
launched an impressive overland operation that weakened Mississippi ' s interior, 
demoralized civilians, and resulted with Pemberton' s surrender of Vicksburg in 4 July 
1863. Learning from this, Grant would apply similar destructive and attritional strategy 
in Virginia. 
Grant instructed Sherman to destroy Jackson quickly because to leave it 
untouched risked the operation and Grant could not fail again. Grant also needed to 
move rapidly across the interior to cut Vicksburg off from the rest of the state. 
Accordingly, after the battles of Raymond and Jackson, Grant' s army quickly hit 
Pemberton's forces at Champion Hill (16 May) and Big Black River (17 May).223 Grant 
lost 7,200 men in comparison to a Confederate loss of 4,300 men in seventeen days. 
22 1 Waugh, U.S. Grant, 76. 
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Recognizing Grant's latest strategy and its success while standing on Vicksburg's 
heights, Sherman complimented "I could never see the ending until now. But this is a 
campaign. This is a success if we never take the town."224 
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Building from his 1863 Mississippi experience, in May 1864 Grant informed 
Meade "Lee's Army will be your objective point. Wherever Lee goes, here you will go 
also."225 The first step in this plan was to surround Lee's forces at the Wilderness (5-7 
May) and push towards Richmond. Although Grant suffered 17,500 casualties, he 
quickly regrouped and hit Lee a second time at Spotsylvania Court House (8-21 May). 226 
This limited recess between engagements was one of Grant's signatures that he cultivated 
in 1863. From his Mississippi victories and his earlier triumphs at Fort Donelson and 
Fort Henry he learned to never let the enemy rest and reinforce. For instance, in 1862 
Grant remarked, "The art of war is simple enough. Find out where your enemy is. Get at 
him as soon as you can. Strike him as hard as you can, and keep moving on. "227 
According to this strategy, although the press nicknamed him the "butcher," Grant would 
implement attritional warfare in Virginia.228 
After the bloody battles at the Wilderness and Spotsylvania, even though Grant 
lost thirty-two thousand men in eight days, he ordered the infamous frontal assaults at 
Cold Harbor. In the four weeks between the Wilderness and Petersburg, the Federals 
suffered forty-four thousand casualties while the Confederates sustained some twenty-
five thousand.229 Although the Overland campaign would stalemate outside Petersburg, 
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Grant's "new kind of relentless, ceaseless warfare" that he practiced in the West 
contributed to the enemy' s surrender at Appomattox in April 1865.230 While these are 
broad comparisons, there are clear parallels between the two theaters that scholars cannot 
ignore if they want to understand hard war during the Civil War. 
Conclusion 
With Porter, Sherman, and Grierson's diversions, and Grant's impressive march 
through Mississippi's southeastern quadrant, the Union Army "swept the enemy before 
[them] to Jackson and back again to Vicksburg, reaching, after unexampled skill, the very 
points [they] aimed to secure in December."231 With these operations, along with 
Sherman' s subsequent destruction of Jackson on 15 May, the Union began embracing 
hard war strategy.232 The destruction Grant and Sherman allowed during the 1863 
Vicksburg campaign laid the foundation for his 1864 Overland campaign and Major 
General Philip H. Sheridan's Shenandoah Valley expedition, in which Union 
commanders brought the devastating reality of war to Southern civilians. 
Grant's Vicksburg campaign also paralleled Sherman's swath through Georgia 
and the Carolinas. In 1863, Grant permitted his troops to confiscate supplies and animals 
that possibly aided the Confederacy. Additionally, Grant and his commanders did not 
punish the theft of personal items. Although this was innovative for the Federal Army in 
1863, it would become typical later in the war. Another action that would become 
commonplace in 1864 and 1865 was the Union's harassment of Southern women, the 
raiding of private residences, and the theft of personal belongings, such as jewelry, 
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clothing, and furniture. The following case study explores Sherman' s consent of such in 
Mississippi and his later more infamous campaigns. 
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CHAPTER III 
BATTLES ON THE HOME FRONT 
They are as much governed by the rules of war as if in the ranks. 
- William. T. Sherman233 
During his Atlanta campaign, William T. Sherman ordered the deportation of 
Southern women and children from Roswell Factory, Georgia. Union Brigadier General 
Kenner Garrard had already burned the town's factory on 6 July 1864, because it 
supplied the Confederacy with cloth initially "reserved for use of United States 
hospitals."234 Garrard explained, "Over the woolen factory the French flag was flying, 
but seeing no Federal flag above it I had the building burnt. All are burnt. The cotton 
factory was worked up to the time of its destruction, some 400 women, being 
employed. " 235 
Sherman complimented Garrard's prompt actions and declared, "arrest the owners 
and employee[s) and send them, under guard, charged with treason, to Marietta, and I 
will see as to any man in America hoisting the French flag and then devoting his labor 
and capital in supplying armies in open hostility to our Government. .. Should you, under 
the impulse of anger, natural at contemplating such perfidy, hang the wretch, I approve 
the act before hand."236 Sherman later added, "I repeat my orders that you arrest all 
people, male and female, connected with those factories, no matter what the clamor and 
let them foot it. .. The poor women will make a howl. Let them take their children and 
clothing, provided they have the means of hauling or you can spare them. We will retain 
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them until they can reach a country where they can live in peace and security."237 
On 7 July, Sherman informed Major General Henry W. Halleck that the factories 
had aided the Confederacy for years, and therefore, his troops justifiably destroyed them. 
Sherman emphasized that the owners willingly manufactured goods "tainted with 
treason." Consequently, he intended "to get rid of them."238 Sherman' s expulsion of 
women and children was severe, as was his soldiers' destruction of the factory. 
However, this was not the first time Sherman permitted his troops to bum private 
property or threaten Southern women. The first time Sherman's troops implemented hard 
war was in May 1863. Sherman and Major General Ulysses S. Grant began such actions 
during their 1863 Vicksburg campaign. Sherman, especially, would continue to allow his 
soldiers to harass Southern women. Sherman would continue to support these actions 
and demand that his soldiers bring the war to both Southern men and women. 
As part of the new strategy, Union commanders allowed, and later encouraged, 
their troops to harass Southern women, raid private residences, and steal personal 
belongings, such as jewelry, clothing, and furniture. By 1864, Sherman considered 
Southern women a threat to his campaign, his men, and the overall war effort, and he 
observed that although "exempt from conscription, they are as much governed by the 
rules of war as if in the ranks."239 Consequently, Sherman permitted his men to harass 
them and, as the opening account demonstrated, he had the women banished. 
War and Gender, Women and Sherman 
Gender historians Nina Silber and Catherine Clinton describe the study of gender 
and the Civil War as a collision between traditional military history, women's history, 
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and social and cultural history.240 Gender historians emphasize specific groups of women 
and men, their wartime experiences, and how those influenced or were influenced by 
society's gender ideals and expectations.241 In addition to exploring women and men's 
lives, scholars have also investigated how numerous factors - race, class, and region -
shaped Northerners and Southerners.242 
Silber and Clinton explain that because Southern women were closer to the 
"chaos of the battlefield," they frequently encountered Union soldiers. Therefore, 
Southern women felt the war's repercussions far more directly and frequently than their 
Northern counterparts.243 Because of this phenomenon, most studies focus more on 
Southern women than on their Yankee sisters. While studies on Northern women have 
increased, analyses of Southern women still dominate the scholarship, though gaps exist. 
For instance, only a few gender historians have explored Southern women's experiences 
during periods of Union occupation.244 Moreover, scholars have largely ignored 
Southern women as victims of hard war, especially during the Army of the Tennessee's 
1863 Vicksburg campaign. Hoping to fill this historiographical void, this thesis offers a 
new interpretation by examining Grant and Sherman's hard war strategy in Mississippi. 
As part of the growing field of Civil War era gender history, scholars have offered 
their versions of "Why the South lost" and the evolution of gender roles during wartime. 
Drew Gilpin Faust argues that, as a result of their wartime experiences, Southern women 
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"sought to invent new foundations for self-definition and self-worth ."245 As more men 
went to war and left women to manage the home front, Southern women became 
disillusioned with the South's idealized gender roles and the war.246 Faust further 
explains that while Southern women attempted to maintain household control, their most 
significant problem was slave management. The peculiar institution depended on 
dominance, which challenged the concept of women as submissive and passive. Their 
inability to master their slaves and their homes, especially with the influx of Union 
troops, eventually undermined Southern women's support for both slavery and the 
Confederate cause.247 Frustration with their own incompetence persuaded many 
Southern women, as Faust argues, that the "institution had become a greater 
inconvenience than benefit."248 
Confirming Faust's assertion, one woman exclaimed in March 1864, "Oh! This 
cruel war! Ma, sometimes I feel about desperate, and almost wish I could take a Rip Van 
Winkle sleep till all is over and settled."249 Faust further contends that desperation 
moved Southern women to insist that their men desert or surrender, because they too had 
"needs, interests, and even rights, not just duties and obligations. "250 In her article, 
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246 Faust, Mothers of Invention. 
247 Sarah Katherine Stone, Brokenburn: The Journal of Kate Stone, 1861-1868 (Baton Rouge: 
Louisiana State University Press, 1955, 1972), 3, 8, 14, 32-33; Giselle Roberts, The Confederate Belle 
(Columbia, MO: University of Missouri Press, 2003), 55-56; Faust, Mothers of Invention, 56. For more 
information on Southerners' wartime roles, see Francis Butler Simkins and James Welch Patton, The 
Women of the Confederacy (Richmond, VA: Garrett and Massie, 1936), 111-16; Drew Gilpin Faust, 
"Tryi ng to Do a Man's Business: Slavery, Vio lence, and Gender in the American Civil War" Gender and 
History 4 (June 1992) 2: 197-214; George C. Rab le, Civil Wars: Women and the Crisis of Southern 
Nationalism (Champaign, IL: Univers ity of Illinois Press, 199 1 ), 11 2-21; Laura F. Edwards, Scarlett 
Doesn't live Here Anymore: Southern Women in the Civil War Era (Champaign, IL: Un iversity of Illinois 
Press, 2000), 77-79. 
248 Faust, Mothers of invention, 73. . 
249 Louisa Henry to "Ma," 28 March 1864, C lark-Boddie Family Papers, Mississippi Department 
of Arch ives and History, Jackson, Mississippi, quoted in Smith, Mississippi in the Civil War, 163. 
25° Faust, Mothers of Invention, 235. 
"Altars of Sacrifice: Confederate Women and the Narratives of War," Faust concludes 
that a main reason the South surrendered was because Southern women demanded it. 251 
53 
The feminine ideal of the patriotic Confederate woman emphasized female self-
sacrifice. This not only meant sending their loved ones to battle, but also assuming 
domestic endeavors for the war effort.252 During the war Southern women knitted socks, 
sewed uniforms, prepared supplies, and entered the workforce to equip the army. These 
efforts combined with their letters to soldiers sustained military morale. For young 
ladies, this antebellum model shaped their support for the Confederacy and defined their 
wartime duties. 253 A major part of the feminine ideal was the preservation of honor. 
While male family members defended honor on the battlefield, Southern society expected 
women to uphold honor on the home front, especially in the form of "domestic 
· · ,,254 patnotlsm. 
Historian Timothy Smith reveals that Mississippi women needed to fill roles 
previously relegated to men. Kate Foster from Okolona, Mississippi reported that "They 
not only had to care for the children, and the stock, manage the negroes and the farms, 
but they had to make clothes and food for those at home and for those far away in the 
army. The long-discarded arts of spinning and weaving and dyeing with the bark of trees 
were revived. Many a Confederate soldier lies shrouded in grey made by his wife's hand 
or that of some other loved one."255 
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Southern women's support of the war was undeniably linked to Confederate 
soldier morale. Faust states that "from the outset the home front was acknowledged to 
exert significant control over military morale," and as desertions and dissatisfaction 
increased the connection became clearer. As illustrated by numerous women's letters to 
newspapers, politicians, and their male counterparts, women 's approval decided the war's 
outcome.256 Therefore, Union persecution of Southern women affected the Confederate 
war effort. By harassing women and threatening their femininity, Union officers 
indirectly attacked Southern manhood and their ability to protect their homes. Civil War 
scholars explain that preservation of home was a driving reason for Southern soldier 
enlistment. By raiding Southern homes, Northern soldiers attacked the very thing 
Southerners were trying to protect. 257 
Building from Faust's suggestion that wartime demands "went right to the core of 
the antebellum gender quid pro quo between men and women, in which men had 
promised to ' protect' and women had agreed to 'obey,"' historian LeeAnn Whites also 
explains that the Civil War challenged Southern whites' males' masculinity and power.258 
When Union soldiers invaded their homes, white Southern men discovered that they 
could not sustain their masculine identities as warriors any longer. 259 Therefore, Whites 
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argues, the war presented Southern white men with "a crisis for their masculinity, a threat 
to their manhood as it was socially constructed."260 
Whites also analyzes the "patriarchal republic" of Georgia and the transformation 
of the society's gender roles and expectations throughout the war. Similar to Faust and 
Smith, Whites reveals that hostilities originally solidified Southern women's support of 
the war. However, as the war continued and the death toll rose, Southern social 
constructions of gender and race changed.261 An important part of this transformation 
was the Union's emergent hard war strategy. While Union harassment of women was 
commonplace during Sherman' s 1864 March to the Sea, as illustrated by Joseph 
Glatthaar' s March to the Sea and Beyond: Sherman's Troops in the Savannah and 
Carolinas Campaigns, and Jacqueline Glass Campbell's When Sherman Marched North 
from the Sea: Resistance on the Confederate Home Front, it did not begin there.262 In 
fact, Grant and Sherman permitted their soldiers to intimidate Southern women, pillage 
private homes, and to steal jewelry and other personal items to demoralize the Southern 
civilian population as early as 1863. 
Building on the works of William Blair and Gary Gallagher, Jacqueline Glass 
Campbell examines the interaction between civilians, government officials, and the two 
armies, and contends that a lack of Confederate nationalism did not cause Confederate 
defeat. In contrast to Faust and Whites, Campbell argues that white southerners' 
commitment to the cause persisted into early 1865.263 According to Campbell , 
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incursions verbally and sometimes physically. 264 
56 
LeeAnn Whites and Alecia P. Long, in their edited collection Occupied Women: 
Gender, Military Occupation, and the American Civil War, demand that women be 
integrated into the Civil War' s military history by obliterating the distinction between 
home front and battlefront. According to Whites, women acted "not as the hapless 
victims of collateral damage of Union occupation or as the occasional and atypical 
politicized woman but as the critical bottom rail of the war of occupation."265 
In response, Lisa Tendrich Frank examines Sherman' s troops raids on women's 
bedrooms during the March to the Sea. In her review of Sherman's hard war strategy, 
Frank asserts that many women in Georgia and South Carolina believed that soldiers 
would not harass them because of their gender. Nevertheless, Union soldiers 
enthusiastically raided women's most personal spaces, their bedrooms, and personal 
belongings. Frank reveals that by late 1864, Sherman allowed, and even encouraged, 
such behavior because he understood that to defeat the Confederate armies, the Union 
had to subdue Confederate civilians.266 She further argues, "gender shaped the 
interactions and reactions of Confederate women and the Northern soldiers that they 
faced."267 Tendrich contends that Federal officers encouraged their men to raid women's 
bedrooms and personal spaces as a way of demoralizing the civilian population and 
264 Campbell, When Sherman Marched North from the Sea. . 
265 Whites and Long, Occupied Women, 6. : 
266 Lisa Tendrich Frank, "Bedrooms as Battlefields: The Role of Gender Pol itics in Sherman 's 
March" in Whites and Long, Occupied Women. 
267 Frank, "Bedrooms as Battlefields," 33. 
57 
winning the war. Therefore, while some women remained steadfast in their support of 
the Confederate war effort, many women - both rich and poor - revoked their support and 
told their men to return home.268 
Union troops harassed Southern women and invaded their personal spaces in late 
1864. For instance, in 1864 Thomas T. Taylor, an Ohio soldier, wrote that his fellow 
soldiers smashed "jars, dishes, furniture, &c" and "then robbed beds of their bedding, 
wardrobes of their clothing, and cut open [mattresses]."269 According to Taylor, soldiers 
considered these actions concurrent to Sherman's order "to forage liberally" as part of his 
Special Order No. 120 that launched his Atlanta campaign.270 This thesis argues, 
however, that Union commanders initially began embracing such tactics during the 1863 
Vicksburg campaign. For instance, in Jackson, Sherman told his troops to make 
"everything public not needed by us" inoperable.27 1 While this is not as extreme as his 
orders in 1864, it was different from the Union' s early policy of conciliation. The 1863 
Vicksburg campaign began hard war's evolution as an accepted strategy. 
Hard War in the Home 
While in Jackson, Grant oversaw the evacuation and burning of the Pearl River 
Mills cotton factory. Like the Roswell , Georgia factory, the owners claimed to be 
producing cloth for civilians, but primarily manufactured uniforms for the Confederate 
Army. In response to this treason, Grant announced, "They had done enough work" and 
demanded it be leveled.272 When one of the owners approached Grant and Sherman to 
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spare the factory, because it employed many of the city's young women and poor 
families, Sherman replied, "The United States could better afford to compensate the 
Greens for their property, and feed the poor families thus thrown out of employment than 
to spare the property."273 
Sherman added that if the poor families cannot feed themselves, the Union Army 
would provide food, but reminded the families that they should seek employment or 
refuge in "some more peaceful land."274 Neither Grant nor Sherman sympathized with 
the female workers or the owners. In fact, years later when the Green brothers requested 
compensation because Northern troops destroyed their "private" property, Grant 
declined.275 As with the Roswell factory, the Greens may have owned the Pearl River 
Mills cotton factory, but the stores' purpose and location and Greens' Confederate 
loyalties resulted in their factory's destruction.276 
Grant and Sherman's ambiguous definitions of private and government property 
formed a crucial part of their early hard war strategy. Union soldiers were not only 
shattering items of potential military benefit, but also Southern civilian and soldier 
morale. By ordering their troops to despoil any buildings or items that "could be easily 
converted," Grant and Sherman approved excessive destruction and confiscation.277 
Union soldiers in 1863 took advantage of this order and ransacked private homes, stole 
jewelry and clothing, took food, livestock, draft animals, and damaged other items that 
did not truly pose a threat to the U.S. Army.278 For example, in addition to military 
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buildings, Union troops also raided the Daily Mississippian (newspaper) office, the post 
office, the Governor' s mansion, and Greens' bank, Ambrogia' s grocery, Allen & Ligon 's 
store, and numerous houses.279 
Contemporary news reports and several civilians' writings reveal that Sherman' s 
men ruined many, if not all, Jackson' s private residences in May 1863. 280 This thesis 
argues that Sherman permitted - or at least failed to punish - such destruction. The 
similarities between soldiers' activities in Mississippi to those later in Georgia and the 
Carolinas illustrate that the Union was formulating this new type of warfare one year 
earlier in Jackson. By not punishing the unnecessary destruction of private residences, 
especially women's bedrooms and personal items, Sherman introduced an innovative 
hard war strategy. 
The demolition of the Southern home front also had an adverse affect on 
Confederate soldier morale. As revealed by historians Drew Gilpin Faust, Stephanie 
McCurry, and LeeAnn Whites, Southern women and men at home commonly wrote to 
their family members in the Confederate Army of their dismay and such reports most 
likely disheartened Southern soldiers.28 1 For instance, William A. Bisland, a member of 
the 261h Regiment, Louisiana Volunteers, linked his fiancee 's morale with his own. By 
August 1862, his fiancee 's letters became more despondent and gloomy, and Bisland 
worried about her devotion to the cause. Bisland regarded Caroline's emotional outbursts 
as unwomanly and unpatriotic. He chastised her, "This is the time when we must keep a 
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bold front and it is rather a sign of weakness to despond. If we cannot bear some of the 
ills and trials of like, we are not deserving of our independence-and at the same time it 
shows a distrust of the good providence who can overrule all these things to our good." 
Bisland concluded, "Cheer up, and be more of a woman, more deserving of the esteem 
and affection of a soldier."282 Months later, his fiancee remained depressed and Bisland 
told her to knit socks, to keep the home fires burning and to sustain morale by writing 
optimistic letters to soldiers away at war.283 
Historian Timothy Smith also explains that by summer 1863, many Southern 
women felt dismayed and lost with the large and destructive incursions into their state. 
One woman wrote in May 1863, "Truly this is a day of darkness for our nation, but let us 
hope that it is soon to pass; the darkest hour is just before day; it has been said."284 
Another wrote in July 1863, "I felt as if our Country had cast us off."285 The fall of 
Jackson and Vicksburg played heavily on these women's minds, as did the harassment 
from Federal soldiers during Grant' s campaign for Vicksburg and Jackson in 1863.286 It 
is no wonder that Faust and others argue that demoralization of the home front 
contributed to the Confederacy' s surrender. For instance, many Jackson families 
returned to find their homes burned or looted. 287 The Brandon Republican declared, 
"nearly all private residences were entered, trunks forced open, the clothing tom to 
282 William Bisland to Caroline Pride, 11 August 1862, Bisland-Shields Fami ly Papers, 
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pieces, jewelry, silverware and provisions taken."288 Soldiers took "merchandise, books, 
papers, and money" from numerous stores and residences.289 Luther S. Baechtel, a 
Treasury Department clerk noted "The Yankees broke into my room, broke open the 
boxes, [and] stole my flute."290 Along with the loss of his flute, boots, brushes and comb, 
a mosquito net, and two vases, the Union troops left him with "nothing but books in bad 
condition, papers, and fumiture."291 
This was the experience of many residents after the Union's first occupation of 
the city in May 1863, and many other Southerners in 1864 and 1865. By taking or 
destroying private items of no military benefit, such as jewelry, dresses, and silverware, 
Northern soldiers showed that they could tear apart the Confederacy from the private 
sphere. These actions that Grant and Sherman permitted in 1863, and would later 
encourage, brought the war to the Southern home front. 
Jane Clark Pickett of Jackson, who fled the Yankee's arrival, described her fear in 
July 1863, "Oh! I cannot grasp the great events passing through our much loved country." 
She continued, "The woe and desolation weeping all around us, we and many of our 
friends driven from homes, and which even now may lay in ashes."292 As with many 
other Mississippi residents after Grant's 1863 Vicksburg campaign, she "received letters 
continually from the overseer, and Mr. Craig whose family is at our House, if it is still 
288 Frantz, "What the Enemy Did to Jackson." 
289 Frantz, "What the Enemy Did to Jackson." 
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standing, until the fall of Vicksburg; since then we have received none from them. "293 It 
was not until months later that they received the news that their house, along with a 
friend's, "has been burned down, and all the negroes taken."294 She further related, " if 
the fortunes of war should threaten me with degradation I am not compelled to live."295 
Pickett later heard of"the sacking [of] our houses on both places," and how the 
Union soldiers "told the negroes they were free & had the right to everything they say; at 
that the negroes rushed into the house, and now the great effort was who could get the 
most."296 She went on to describe, "my libraries were robbed of their contents," and that 
the Union troops said, " they had the greatest treat they had in Miss. in my pantry among 
cordials, wines, & preserves."297 So as with other Jackson families, not only did the 
Federals help themselves to provisions, but also unnecessary items, such as books. 
Letitia Dabney Miller of Raymond, Mississippi also witnessed the Union's first 
practice of hard war when they raided her father's farm. Federal soldiers burned up all 
the fences for their cooking pots, then they raided the hen house and the smoke house. 
They also drove off her family' s cow and calf. She reported that, after the Yankees ' visit, 
her family only consumed "game, partridges, and squirrels" to survive.298 Along with 
provisions, the Federal soldiers also took the Millers' china, books, and shoes that were 
most likely in the most private of rooms - parlor or bedrooms. These destructive actions 
293 Jane Clark Pickett to Mother, 25 July 1863. 
294 Jane Clark Pickett to Mother, 25 July 1863. 
295 Jane Clark Pickett to Mother, 25 July 1863. 
296 Jane Clark Pickett to Mother, 23 September 1863. 
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Southern Historical Collection, The Wilson Library, University ofNorth Carolina at Chapel Hill , 11 , 
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performed by Union soldiers and permitted by their officers, formed an integral part of 
the early hard war strategy and demoralized the Southern civilian population.299 
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Mrs. J. W. Russell, who lived in Diamond Hill, Mississippi, also witnessed Union 
troops' actions during Grant' s Inland campaign. Living near the intersection of Fourteen 
Mile Creek and the Utica-Raymond road, a few miles southwest of Raymond, 
McPherson' s troops pillaged her plantation after the Battle of Raymond. She informed 
her husband, who was serving in Tennessee, that Union soldiers approached her in search 
of food and supplies. Russell stated, "I let them have the keys, and they ransacked the 
smokehouse, took most of our meat, took all the tobacco."300 
Although Russell claimed soldiers treated her with the "utmost politeness," some 
were as "ravenous as wolves" and took cows, milk, every mule, chickens, and her bed 
clothes. As with the Union's ensuing destruction of Jackson and their raid of the Miller 
farm, Federal soldiers not only took the necessary items, but also Russell's bed clothes. 
The act of acquiring the latter, most likely taken from her bedroom, infiltrated her private 
sphere. Even though historian Nina Silber contends that Confederate women combined 
the public and private spheres during wartime, a Southern woman's bedroom was still her 
sanctuary.301 By disturbing that private place, Union soldiers invaded one of the last 
places not touched by the war. 
Along with raiding her private spaces - although Union soldiers did not disturb 
her wardrobe - Russell explained that Northern troops frightened her slaves, especially 
the females. She noted, "the Yankees forced or threatened & persuaded the negroes to 
299 Letitia Dabney Mi lier Recollections, 1926, I 0. 
300 Ashcraft, " Mrs. Russell and the Battle of Raymond, Mississ ippi," 38-40. 
301 Nina Silber, Gender and the Sectional Conflict (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina 
Press, 2008); Frank, " Bedrooms as Battlefields." 
go."302 They told one of her female slaves, Sarah, that if she did not join them they 
"would burn every house on the place," and eventually all of her slaves were gone. 
Russell also recorded, "every place in country has been visited by them." 303 Although 
Grant's men left her with little as they pushed through the state, Russell did not seem 
entirely demoralized by the experience in her letter. This is most likely because, 
according to the antebellum ideal, Southern women did not show fear or weakness 
publicly. However, as illustrated below, some Southern women did express fear and 
distress privately, especially in their diaries. 
Historian Timothy Smith explained that over the years, the idea emerged that 
white Southern women remained united and loyal in the face of the Federals, because 
their letters to the battle front appeared steadfast. One Natchez minister recorded, "The 
cheerfulness with which they submitted to every trial and the energy with which they 
provided for the welfare and comfort of the soldier, whether in the field or hospital , 
cheered and sustained more than every other earthly consideration."304 
Yet, as seen in the women' s own diaries, not all were as loyal or brave as they 
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seemed. According to the ideal, Southern women could not admit their distress publicly, 
but they filled their private writings with suffering. For instance, Kate Foster explained 
in her diary, "We ought to remember that we all have relatives, friends or lovers in our 
army and if they these things it might weaken a strong army in time of battle and sickens 
302 Ashcraft, " Mrs. Russell and the Battle of Raymond, Mississippi," 39 .. 
303 Ashcraft, " Mrs. Russell and the Battle of Raymond, M ississippi," 39. 
304 Reverend J. Whitner Kennedy, "Life of the Reverend Benjamin C hase, As Recorded in his 
Own Hand, In a Two Year Diary," Mississippi Department of Archives and History, Jackson, Mississippi, 
10, quoted in Smith, Mississippi in the Civil War, 175. 
stout & loving heart."305 Illustrating women's need to keep suffering in their private 
thoughts, Russell in her letter reported, "I have borne it all very cheerfully, so far."306 
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Yet in their diaries and private letters to family members also on the home front, 
women expressed their fears openly. For instance, with the fall of Jackson and Vicksburg 
one woman wrote in July 1863, "our state has gone up," and she feared that she might not 
be able to send another letter before "our State is entirely gone." She later confided, "I 
want this troublesome time of war to pass away swiftly and once more to realize peace & 
independence."307 Sarah Poates also expressed her want for the war to end in her diary. 
After years of hardship, her view of war began to change; and by 1864 she confided, " It 
does appear to me I cannot live if he [her husband] has to stay away from home. I 
suppose I shall endure it someway, and as others are obliged to. I do hope though that he 
may be permitted to stay at home."308 Months later, she complained, "When will this 
cruel war end? I fear not soon, I am so lonely, so wretched, there is nothing to live for 
but sad stern duty, no further pleasure since my dear husband is away." She later 
specified, "Duty, duty, only to sustain me."309 
Historian Timothy Smith confirmed that, like Sarah Poates and Alice Sears, many 
Mississippi women found their support for the Confederacy waning with more and more 
hardship, especially after the 1863 Vicksburg campaign. Yet, they could not express 
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such dismay publicly according to the antebellum ideal.310 However, Russell' s and 
Pickett's letters still conveyed extreme devastation to Confederate soldiers away from 
home. Furthermore, the growing hardships on the home front, compounded with an 
increased threat from Federal soldiers in their state, women like Jane Pickett began to feel 
demoralized. 
Hard War in July 
Union troops continued to assault civilians without reprimand in July when 
Sherman occupied Jackson a second time. Proud of his achievements, Sherman informed 
Grant, "The inhabitants are subjugated. They cry aloud for mercy. The land is 
devastated for 30 miles around."311 Union troops also raided private bedrooms in New 
Albany (northern Mississippi) during July 1864. One woman attempted to hide her 
valuables in a secret compartment over her piazza. However, the Union soldiers searched 
the house, "All day working like ants," and eventually uncovered her hiding place. 
Along with finding her valuables, the soldiers stole household items such as clothes, 
beds, and blankets.312 
These, like the ones taken from Jackson and Raymond households in 1863, were 
most likely in bedrooms, parlors, and other private spaces. Invasions into these private 
areas demoralized Southern women. The Union Army continued to implement such 
actions in 1864 and 1865. Historian Lisa Tendrich Frank explains that, Sherman's men 
purposefully entered bedrooms to demoralize the Southern women, especially in Georgia 
3 10 Smith, Mississippi in the Civil War, 175. 
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~nd the Carolinas.313 Reports such as these wore down many Confederate soldiers and 
eventually contributed to Union victory in 1865. 
Further Developing Hard War 
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After Sherman's destruction of Jackson in May and July 1863, he would continue 
to target Southern civilians with his Meridian expedition. As with Mississippi's capital, 
Sherman not only wrecked Meridian's rail junction, but also private property.314 
Sherman contended that such devastation, similar to his success in Jackson, would 
"paralyze" all of Mississippi and Mobile, Alabama.315 Mirroring Jackson, Sherman's 
men "worked hard and with a will, in that work of destruction, with axes, sledges, 
crowbars, clawbars, and with fire, and I have no hesitation in pronouncing the work well 
done. Meridian with its Depots, Storehouses, Arsenals, offices, Hospitals, Hotels, and 
Cantonments, no longer exists."316 
Along with overseeing the burning, confiscating, or destruction of anything that 
could be easily converted to "hostile uses," Sherman also struck private residences. In 
January 1864, shortly before he launched his Meridian expedition, Sherman remarked, 
So long as non-combatants remain in their houses and keep to their 
accustomed peaceful business, their opinions and prejudices can in no 
wise influence the war, and therefore should not be noticed; but if any one 
comes out into the public streets and creates disorder, he or she should be 
punished, restrained, or banished . .. These are well-established principles 
of war, and the people of the South having appealed to war, are barred 
from appealing for protection to our constitution, which they have 
practically and publicly defied. They have appealed to war, and must 
abide its rules and laws.317 
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While this statement regarding noncombatants echoes the 1862 Confiscation Act, 
Sherman's attention to "women, children, and non-combatants," is noteworthy. Sherman 
is not only referring to men unable to fight, but also the families of soldiers and 
guerillas. 318 Historian Mark Grimsley also considers this statement striking because it 
recognized the existence of inhabitants who were not hostile, but still subject to Federal 
strategy. Grimsley further states, "Sherman had long endorsed the existing Union policy 
of distinguishing between Unionists, neutral, and actively hostile Southern civilians."319 
Therefore, this letter confirms that by January 1864 Sherman had accepted the new 
Federal policy of hard war that he began embracing during the 1863 Vicksburg 
· 320 campaign. 
While in Jackson in May 1863 Sherman told Brigadier General Joseph A. Mower, 
"The feeling of pillage and booty will injure the morals of the troops, and bring disgrace 
to the cause."321 But earlier that day, he informed Mower to "Push the work of 
destruction, especially types, presses, sugar, and everything public not needed by us. The 
work should be done by 10 a.m. to-morrow ... You must work at night, if necessary, to 
destroy what might be useful to an enemy. "322 Like Grant's initial emphasis on "all," 
Sherman's use of the word "might" illustrates the aimed extent of the destruction. 
Sherman expected his men to destroy anything that could be possibly "converted" or 
"useful to an enemy." As seen later in Georgia, Union troops considered this all-
encompassing and obscure description to include private property.323 Although Sherman 
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only plainly stated in 1864 that his soldiers should punish, restrain, or banish disorderly 
Southern civilians and now they must "abide" to the rules of war, Grant and Sherman 
began to craft their gendered hard war strategy a year earlier during the 1863 Vicksburg 
campaign.324 
During his Meridian expedition, which historian Buckley T. Foster' s argues was 
Sherman's true "dress rehearsal" for hard war, Sherman's men destroyed numerous 
private residences, hospitals, hotels, and offices.325 Similar to the Union' s sack of 
Jackson, these were not military buildings, but since the enemy could easily convert them 
to hostile uses, Sherman allowed his men bum the buildings. Sherman continued to be 
unbothered by wanton destruction. For instance, on his march back to Vicksburg after 
his successful and destructive Meridian expedition, Sherman claimed, "many cotton-gins 
and piles of cotton were burned by our soldiers and by negroes without orders and 
detection .. .I attach little importance to these matters, but the great result attained is the 
hardihood and confidence imparted in command, which is now better fitted for war."326 
As seen earlier in spring 1863, these actions - encouraged or unpunished - demoralized 
the civilian population and the Confederate military. 
Georgia and Beyond 
Recognizing this connection between the two fronts, Sherman declared in 
September 1864, " If the people raise a howl against my barbarity and cruelty, I will 
answer that war is war, and not popularity-seeing. If they want peace, they and their 
324 Sherman to Sawyer, 3 1 January 1864, Rachel Sherman Thorndike, ed. , The S~erman l etters: 
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relatives must stop the war."327 While Sherman did not state this plainly until 1864, 
Grant and the other officers' growing acceptance of plundering shows the evolution of 
the Union's strategy and acceptance of their troops' attacks on the home front. 
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Sherman's targeting of military buildings and equipment would intensify with the 
March to the Sea. Historian Joseph Glatthaar suggests that Sherman's aim was to 
demonstrate the "terribleness of war."328 For instance, after Sherman's destruction of 
Jackson (May and July 1863), Meridian (February 1863), and his deportation of the 
Roswell, Georgia women, Union troops continued their devastation in the town of New 
Manchester on Sweet Water Creek due west of Atlanta.329 Like the four hundred 
Roswell mill women, the Federal Army loaded the female factory workers of New 
Manchester into boxcars, given several days' rations, and taken to Kentucky and Indiana 
until the end of the war, after Union troops burned their place of employment. 
Sherman would continue to implement hard war strategy in Atlanta, destroying 
railroads, military materials, and private residences, alike. For example, after Atlanta's 
surrender, Sherman ordered the city's citizens to evacuate. He explained to Halleck that 
he evacuated the city's inhabitants so his troops could use "all the houses of Atlanta for 
military storage and occupation."330 Additionally, Sherman wanted to rebuild the city's 
defenses. But to make these lines the most secure "with the necessary citadels and 
redoubts" Sherman needed to destroy many residences. Sherman further detailed, "As 
captors we have a right to it. .. the residence here of the families of our enemies would be 
327 Sherman to Halleck, 4 September 1864, Sherman, Personal Memoirs, 479. 
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a temptation and a means to keep up a correspondence dangerous and hurtful to our 
cause. "
33 1 
Sherman also explained his decision to Confederate General John Bell Hood. 
Hood chastised Sherman's "studied and ingenious cruelty," and declared, " In the name of 
God and humanity I protest, believing that you will find that you are expelling from their 
homes and firesides the wives and children of a brave people."332 In response Sherman 
reminded Hood, "You, yourself, burned dwelling-houses along your parapet, and I have 
seen to-day fifty houses that you have rendered uninhabitable because they stood in the 
way of your forts and men."333 Sherman also reminded Hood, "General Hardee did the 
same at Jonesborough, and General Johnston did the same last summer at Jackson, 
Mississippi."334 
Revealing his acceptance of hard war strategy, Sherman declared that Hood and 
his commanders "have plunged a nation into war, dark and cruel war; who dared and 
badgered us to battle, insulted our flag, seized our arsenals and forts that were left in the 
honorable custody of peaceful ordnance sergeants . .. hated Lincoln Government; tried to 
force Kentucky and Missouri into rebellion, in spite of themselves ... turned loose your 
privateers to plunder unarmed ships; expelled Union families by the thousands; burned 
their houses and declared by an act of your Congress the confiscation of all debts due 
Northern men for goods had and received."335 Sherman similarly replied to Atlanta' s 
mayor and city counci l, "War is cruelty, and you cannot refine it; and those who brought 
war into our country deserve all the curses and maledictions a people can pour out. I 
33 1 Sherman to Halleck, 20 September 1864, Sherman, Personal Memoirs, 485. 
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know I had no hand in making this war, and I know I will make more sacrifices to-day 
than any of you to secure peace. But you cannot have peace and a division of our 
t ,,336 coun ry .... 
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Sherman' s earlier raids on Jackson in May and July 1863 showed him that his 
soldiers' mass destruction and harassment was effective and could be used to subdue the 
Confederacy. Although, this change did not happen immediately, beginning in Jackson, 
it evolved to become the devastating reality of Sherman's March to the Sea. For 
example, in Jackson, Sherman's men destroyed most of the houses south of Pearl Street 
and State Street, and inflicted five million dollars worth of damage in a town of2,100 
people. 337 In Atlanta, a city of almost ten thousand Sherman aimed to "make Georgia 
howl."338 By October 1864, Sherman voiced, " We are not only fighting hostile armies, 
but a hostile people, and we must make old and young, rich and poor, feel the hard hand 
of war."339 
These orders echo Sherman's earlier sentiments to Halleck in September 1863, in 
which Sherman contended that the Federal Army had the right to " remove and destroy 
every obstacle - if need be, take every life, every acre of land, every particle of property, 
everything that to us seems proper. "340 This statement further mirrors his earlier May 
1863 orders in Jackson, when Sherman told his soldiers to make "everything public not 
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needed by us" inoperable.34 1 Therefore, Sherman and Grant first implemented their hard 
war strategy in spring 1863, months before Sherman' s Meridian campaign, and a year 
before his infamous March to the Sea. 
Conclusion 
The Union's destruction of Jackson, Mississippi in May 1863 was the Army of 
the Tennessee' s first acceptance of hard war strategy. Grant and Sherman would 
continue to use the hard war strategy they begun in 1863 during their later 1864 and 1865 
campaigns. Neither Grant nor Sherman ever explicitly ordered the harassment of 
Southern women in 1863, but their lax punishment for those who did demonstrates that 
Union commanders were considering hard war one year earlier than initially realized. 
The intimidation of Southern women loyal to the Confederacy as a way of attacking their 
men was building in 1863, and Sherman would enthusiastically implement it during his 
later campaigns. Sherman summed up his own decision to wage hard war against 
Southern civilians in February 1865, in a letter to Confederate General Wade Hampton, 
when he stated, "Personally I regret the bitter feelings engendered by this war, but they 
were to be expected, and I simply allege that those who struck the first blow and made 
war inevitable ought not, in fairness, to reproach us for the natural consequences."342 
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CHAPTER IV 
CONCLUSION 
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In March 1865, General William T. Sherman met with President Abraham 
Lincoln aboard the presidential flagship, the River Queen, to discuss Confederate General 
Joseph Johnston's activities in Georgia and the Carolinas. A concerned Lincoln asked 
Sherman about the possibility of Johnston using the railroads to renew the offensive. 
Sherman replied proudly, "My bummers don't do things by halves. Every rail , after 
having been placed over a hot fire, has been twisted as crooked as a ram's-horn, and they 
never can be used again. "343 Although Southerners would not nickname these men -
skilled in destruction - bummers until 1864, Union commanders began to realize their 
efficiency during the 1863 Vicksburg campaign. 
Grant's instructions to destroy the rail line are not simply conventional warfare. 
Grant did not order Sherman to demolish bridges and roads merely to protect his rear, but 
to debilitate the city. Additionally, Grant did not explicitly forbid the demolition or theft 
of private property. These two facets demonstrate that the Union's sack of Jackson in 
May 1863 was the first implementation of hard war as an approved strategy. Along with 
Grant's ordered and Sherman's implemented destruction of Mississippi's capital in May 
1863, the Union's acceptance of General Order No. 100 or Leiber's Code in April 1863 
also ushered in hard war. 
With the Union's destruction of Jackson and Meridian, Mississippi, both Grant 
and Sherman began to understand that they had to sabotage the Confederacy' s roads and 
industry to end the war. Therefore, Sherman continued to implement such during his 
Atlanta campaign. Marching through the heart of Georgia, Sherman encouraged tactics 
343 Sherman, Personal Memoirs , 684-685. 
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he allowed his troops to use during the 1863 Vicksburg campaign. For instance, 
Sherman's men lived off the land, burned Atlanta and the state capital, and destroyed the 
state's rail and telegraph lines.344 
Like Sherman's operations in Georgia and the Carolinas, Grant's actions in the 
Eastern Theater also evolved from his earlier hard war strategy. Grant's choice to 
abandon his supply line during his march to Jackson, combined with Rear Admiral David 
Dixon Porter's, Colonel Benjamin Grierson's, and Sherman's distractions, inspired his 
and Sherman's later hard war strategies. More specifically, Grierson's raid through the 
heart of Mississippi prior to Grant's Inland campaign gave rise to Union Major General 
Philip H. Sheridan's 1864 Shenandoah Valley campaign. These actions, like Grierson's 
in 1863, distracted the Confederate forces, divided the enemy's troops, and destroyed 
many valuable military supplies. Along with confusing the enemy, Sheridan's raids also 
demoralized the Shenandoah Valley's civilian population. Like Sheridan's later success 
in Virginia, Grierson's incursion depressed the state's civilian population. While 
scholars consider the former as hard war, they disregard Grierson' s raid as part of the 
Union ' s early hard war strategy. 
To comprehend fully the North's hard war strategy, Civil War historians must 
understand that Union commanders began to accept hard war as a viable strategy months 
before the Sherman's devastating Meridian expedition. In fact, by late 1862 Grant 
considered the battlefront and home front inherently linked during warfare. To defeat 
one, the other must also be subdued. Therefore, beginning in spring 1863, both Grant 
and Sherman permitted their soldiers to harass women and destroy civilians' personal 
< 
items in Mississippi, and later in Virginia, Georgia, and the Carolinas. As revealed by 
'44 
" Glatthaar, The March to the Sea and Beyond, 5. 
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numerous historians, such as Timothy B. Smith and Drew Gilpin Faust, these attacks on 
the home front demoralized and affected the Confederate Army as well. 
The Army of the Tennessee' s attacks on private property and civilians, along with 
their destruction of military material , in 1863 ushered in the Union's new hard war 
strategy. Although Civil War scholars have overlooked the Vicksburg campaign as 
holding the roots to hard war, by comparing it to later campaigns, this thesis reveals that 
Union commanders began to accept and develop hard war in 1863. In September 1863, 
months before Sherman launched Meridian expedition and seeing hard war' s success 
during the Vicksburg campaign, he declared, "We cannot change the hearts and minds of 
those people of the South, but we can make war so terrible ... [and] make them so sick of 
war that generations would pass away before they would again appeal to it."345 
345 Sherman, Personal Memoirs, 313. 
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